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ABSTRACT 
After the crisis, the European Central Bank introduced a series of unconventional 
monetary policy measures. There is a wide literature about the impact of the monetary policy 
on stock prices, and recent literature focused also on the impact of unconventional monetary 
policy. In addition, a consistent part of the literature examine if the stocks of banks have a 
different sensitivity to monetary policy with respect to non financial firms. This thesis has the 
objective to estimate the impact that the ECB’s unconventional measures have on Eurozone 
bank stock returns. We use an event study methodology, and find that there is a significant 
inverse relation between this new type of policy and stock returns of banks. This relation is 
stronger when the shock is expansionary, and when it takes place in a day without a governing 
council meeting. We examine the role of bank characteristics on the sensitivity of bank stocks, 
finding that the main driver of sensitivity is the bank size, measured by number of employees 
or total assets. Also other characteristics have a role, but not as clear as that of bank size. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Central Bank (ECB) has the primary objective of maintaining price 
stability, defined as an inflation rate below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. To 
achieve its objective, it can adopt various monetary policy measures, which can be divided 
into open market operations, standing facilities and minimum reserve requirements. The main 
policy tool of the ECB is the interest rate applied on the main refinancing operations (MROs), 
that is the main refinancing rate. Through several transmission channels, a change in the main 
refinancing rate can allow to reach the desired price level, and so the price stability. 
Briefly, a change in the policy rate is transmitted to money market rates, which affect, 
among other things, asset prices, which in turn affect consumption and investment choices by 
individuals and firms, which in turn have an effect on prices of goods and services.  
Until the financial crisis, the ECB ensured price stability by increasing and decreasing 
the main refinancing rate. However, after the financial crisis, the conventional policy tools 
were not enough, so the ECB introduced a series of monetary policy measures different from 
the conventional measures, known as unconventional, or non-standard, monetary policy 
measures.  1
The aim of this thesis is to estimate the impact of these unconventional monetary policy 
measures by the ECB on stock returns of Eurozone banks. We will analyze the impact on the 
aggregate banking sector of the Eurozone, and also outside the Eurozone to detect eventual 
spillover effects. Then, given that the impact can differ between single banks, we will 
examine which bank characteristics determine the sensitivity of its stock returns to the 
unconventional monetary policy surprises. 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, we will see the 
conventional monetary policy tools of the ECB and how they were used before the crisis. 
Then, we will see the unconventional monetary policy measures adopted by the ECB from the 
crisis until now (September 2018). 
In the second chapter, we will review the literature about the impact of monetary policy 
on the stock market. This chapter is divided into four sections, firstly, the impact of 
conventional monetary policy on stock market, secondly, the impact of unconventional 
monetary policy on stock market, thirdly, the impact of conventional monetary policy on bank 
 From the start of the introduction until this point, see Delivorias (2015)1
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stocks, fourthly, the impact of unconventional monetary policy on bank stocks. For each of 
these four parts, we will see some of the most cited articles (some articles are not cited a lot, 
but they are selected for their interesting results or methods). Some articles are examined 
briefly, and others are examined more in details. The methods used by some of these articles 
have inspired the methodology used in this thesis. 
In the third chapter, we will see the data collected and the methodology used. The basic 
method is an event study inspired to Haitsma et al. (2016), and some aspects are taken from 
other articles such as Yin and Yang (2013). To examine the role of characteristics, we take a 
sample of 47 Eurozone banks, with their historical stock price from 2000 to 2018, and the 
average value of some characteristics over the same time period. To examine the aggregate 
banking sector impact, we collect the historical prices of FTSE bank indexes of various 
countries or areas. 
In the fourth chapter, we will examine the results for the aggregate bank index, and then 
we will distinguish the variation of the spread into decreases and increases, into changes and 
no changes in the policy direction, and into contemporaneous and not contemporaneous 
conventional policy days. Then, we will examine for each category of the characteristics what 
is their impact on the sensitivity to unconventional monetary policy. In addition, we will 
check the robustness of the results using alternative dataset specifications. 
The first and the second chapter are a summary of the content of other sources, so there 
are no personal contributions in these two chapters. Instead, the third and the fourth chapter 
are focused on the data, methods and results of the analysis of this thesis, also comparing 
them with the articles described in the second chapter. 
This thesis is structured into three levels. Except the abstract, introduction and 
conclusions, the four chapters are divided into sections which in turn are eventually divided 
into subsections.  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CHAPTER 1: THE ECB’S MONETARY POLICY 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section describes the conventional 
tools of monetary policy of the ECB, that is open market operations, standing facilities, and 
minimum reserves requirements, and the conduct of the monetary policy from the birth of the 
monetary union to the crisis. The content of the first section comes from Delivorias (2015). 
In the second section, we will see the unconventional monetary policies decided by the 
ECB from the crisis until now (September 2018). The second section is divided into six 
subsections, the first describes the unconventional monetary policies from the crisis until the 
forward guidance, the second describes the first series of TLTROs, the third describes the 
quantitative easing (QE), the fourth describes the second series of TLTROs, the fifth describes 
the adjustments of the QE program, and the sixth lists other unconventional monetary policy 
decisions. The content of the first and the third subsections comes from Delivorias (2015), 
instead the content of the other subsections comes from the ECB website. The source of the 
content of each subsection is indicated in footnote in each subsection title. 
1.1: THE ECB’S CONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY 
1.1.1: Open market operations  2
Open market operations are the most commonly used tool for managing the liquidity 
situation in the market and signaling the Bank’s stance on monetary policy. The main open 
market operations are the following: 
- Main refinancing operations (MROs) are regular, open market, reverse transactions 
executed by the Eurosystem for the purpose of providing banks with appropriate liquidity. 
The transactions are conducted through weekly standard tenders, in which banks can bid 
for liquidity, and normally have a maturity of one week; 
- Longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) are regular, open market operations, 
executed by the Eurosystem to provide long-term liquidity to the banking system. They are 
carried out through monthly standard tenders and normally have a maturity of three 
months; 
 See Delivorias (2015)2
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- Fine-tuning operations (FTOs) are operations carried out on an ad hoc basis, aimed at 
increasing or decreasing liquidity in the money market and at steering interest rates, in 
order to smooth the effects of unexpected liquidity fluctuations in the market; 
- Structural operations are executed at the initiative of the ECB to adjust the structural 
position of the Eurosystem vis-à-vis the financial sector. They can be conducted using 
reverse transactions, outright operations or the issuance of ECB debt certificates (for 
examples, including the Covered Bond Purchase Programmes, the Asset Backed Securities 
Purchase Programme and the Securities Market Programme). Their frequency can be 
regular or non-regular and their maturity is not standardised. 
The Eurosystem can conduct these open market operations in five ways. 
Usually, it enters into reverse transactions (operations where the Eurosystem buys or 
sells eligible assets under repurchase agreements or undertakes credit operations with eligible 
assets used as collateral). These transactions can be used in all open-market operations but are 
mainly used for MROs and LTROs. 
Otherwise, the Eurosystem can: 
- perform outright transactions, operations where the Eurosystem buys or sells eligible 
assets outright on the market; 
- issue ECB debt certificates, whereby the ECB issues debt certificates at a discount 
with the aim of adjusting the structural position of the Eurosystem vis-à-vis the financial 
sector so as to create or enlarge a liquidity shortage in the market; 
- engage in foreign exchange swaps, whereby the Eurosystem buys/sells euros against 
a foreign currency and, at the same time, sells/buys them back in a forward transaction on a 
specified repurchase date; 
- collect fixed term deposits, whereby the Eurosystem invites counterparties to place 
remunerated fixed-term deposits without collateral with the NCB in the Member State in 
which the counterparty is established. 
1.1.2: Standing facilities  3
Standing facilities are monetary policy operations which aim to provide and absorb 
overnight liquidity and signal general monetary policy stance. It is worth noting that, contrary 
to open market operations which are initiated by the ECB, standing facilities are initiated by 
 See Delivorias (2015)3
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the counterparties, i.e. the credit institutions. Two standing facilities are available: 
- The marginal lending facility which allows banks to borrow overnight funds from 
their national central banks, against eligible collateral; 
- The deposit facility, which allows banks to make overnight deposits with their 
national central banks. 
The interest rate on the marginal lending facility is normally higher (and the interest rate 
on the deposit facility lower) than the corresponding money market rate. As a result, credit 
institutions normally only use the standing facilities in the absence of alternatives. For 
examples, during the recent financial crisis, suspicions concerning the liquidity and solvency 
of a number of banks prompted many credit institutions to keep more central bank reserves 
than required and to deposit the additional reserves in the deposit facility instead of lending 
them out to other banks. 
The rate on the marginal lending facility and the rate on the deposit facility normally 
provide a ceiling and a floor, respectively, for the overnight rate in the money market. By 
setting rates on the standing facilities, the Governing Council effectively determines the 
corridor within which the overnight money market rate can fluctuate. 
1.1.3: Minimum reserves  4
All euro-area banks are required to hold a certain amount of minimum reserves on 
current accounts with their respective NCBs. These amounts are calculated in relation to 
specific items on the balance sheets of the banks, such as deposits. 
According to the ECB, by means of those reserves, central banks are able to stabilize 
money-market interest rates by giving institutions an incentive to smooth the effects of 
temporary liquidity fluctuations, and also to create or enlarge ‘the structural liquidity shortage 
of the banking system’, i.e. the need and demand of banks for central bank credit. This need, 
in turn, gives the ECB the possibility to steer money market rates through open market 
operations, since the ECB allocates liquidity to the banks at a price that matches its policy 
intentions and therefore influences the money market interest rates. 
 See Delivorias (2015)4
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1.1.4: Conduct of monetary policy  5
In April 1999, in the context of the transition to the Monetary Union, the Governing 
Council lowered the ECB’s main refinancing rate by 0.5% (from 3% to 2.5%) to counter 
receding inflationary pressures. 
From November 1999 to October 2000, the Governing Council decided to raise the key 
interest rates to contain inflationary pressures created by strong economic growth, rising 
import prices and high monetary growth. 
Between May 2001 and June 2003, the Governing Council cut the key interest rates to 
protect the economy from the impact of slower economic growth, adjustments in financial 
markets (the dot com crash in the US) and geopolitical uncertainty. Given that this last 
intervention helped contain price pressures and that the state of the economy did not 
deteriorate markedly, the Governing Council decided to leave the key ECB interest rates 
unchanged until December 2005. 
Starting in January 2006 and until the financial crisis (mid-2007), the Governing 
Council raised the key interest rates from 2% to 4.25% in order to counter the inflationary 
pressures created by faster growth and the expansion of the supply of money and credit in the 
euro area. 
1.2: THE ECB’S UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY 
1.2.1: From the crisis to the forward guidance  6
Starting from the birth of the Monetary Union (1999) until the European debt crisis 
(2009), the ECB ensured price stability by increasing or decreasing the rate for its main 
refinancing operations. But with the crisis it was not enough, and alternative measures had to 
be identified. 
The financial structure of the euro area differs from that of other large economies such 
as the US in that banks play a crucial role in the financing of the economy and in the 
monetary transmission mechanism. Large corporations can find substitutes for bank lending, 
 See Delivorias (2015)5
 See Delivorias (2015)6
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but this is difficult for SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises), which constitute almost 
99% of all enterprises in the euro area. This affects the way that monetary policy is 
implemented. The ECB’s main operations consist of refinancing operations. This contrasts 
with the US, where Fed’s operations consist mainly of outright purchases and sales of assets 
in the open market, in line with US economy’s greater reliance on capital markets. 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 created uncertainty among 
financial and credit institutions concerning each other’s financial health. This uncertainty 
accentuated pressures that had already existed since the summer of 2007, specifically 
pressures related to significant balance sheet exposures of numerous euro area banks to the 
US subprime housing market. This situation eventually led to a near freeze in interbank 
lending and to the collapse of activities in a large number of financial market segments, and 
threatened to severely limit the financing of the real economy. 
The first priority of the ECB was to accommodate the funding needs of banks. To do so, 
it decided to drastically reduce its key interest rates within a seven-month period from 
October 2008 to May 2009, and to complement this measure with Enhanced Credit Support, a 
set of four non-standard, temporary policy measures described below: 
1. Temporary extension of the maximum maturity of the LTROs from three to twelve 
months. The objective was to keep the money market interest rates at low levels by 
reducing uncertainty in the markets and to provide a longer liquidity planning horizon to 
banks, in order to revive interbank lending and encourage banks to continue providing 
credit to the economy. 
2. Currency swap agreements: the Eurosystem temporarily provided liquidity in foreign 
currencies, most notably in US dollars. The crisis at this stage was still predominantly a US 
crisis, therefore many European banks faced a massive shortfall in US dollar funding. The 
Eurosystem used reciprocal currency arrangements with the Federal Reserve System to 
provide funding in US dollars against Eurosystem eligible collateral with various 
maturities but a fixed interest rates, which reduced market uncertainty. 
3. Collateral eligibility requirements: to facilitate the swap agreements seen above, and 
to allow banks to use a wider range of assets to obtain central bank liquidity, the list of 
eligible collateral accepted in Eurosystem refinancing operations was extended to include, 
for example, asset backed securities. 
4. First Covered Bond Purchase Programme: on 2 July 2009, the Eurosystem launched 
its first Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP1) with the aim of reviving the covered 
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bond market, a primary source of financing for European banks, which had virtually dried 
up in terms of liquidity and issuance. The Eurosystem committed to purchasing covered 
bonds denominated in euros and issued in the euro area for a total value of €60 billion, that 
is 2.5% of the total outstanding amount of covered bonds, in the period between June 2009 
and June 2010. 
In January 2010, markets were expecting a possible Greek sovereign default. Also 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy were facing difficult economic situations, such as a housing 
crisis that evolved into a financial crisis in Spain and Ireland, high public debt in Italy, slow 
growth and increasing debt to GDP ratio in Portugal. Therefore, certain secondary markets for 
government bonds began to dry up. These developments presented the risk of impairing the 
transmission mechanism through three channels: 
1. The price channel, because of the link between government bond prices and the price 
of assets and costs of borrowing in the economy. 
2. The liquidity channel, because government bonds play a crucial role in repurchase 
transactions. 
3. The balance sheet channel, because the price of government bonds would have an 
impact on banks’ balance sheets. 
This sovereign debt crisis brought to the fore institutional design problems of the euro 
area. The Treaties include provisions that prohibit monetary financing by the ECB (Article 
123 TFEU) and bailouts (Article 125 TFEU). Therefore, the ECB was more constrained in its 
actions than, for instance, were the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England.  
To reduce market turbulence, the ECB introduced the Securities Markets Programme in 
May 2010, under which it purchased mainly sovereign bonds on the secondary markets. In 
addition, it sterilized its interventions by offering banks, on a weekly basis, interest bearing 
deposits for an amount equal to the amount of government bonds it purchased. At its peak, the 
programme’s volume totaled around €210 billion. According to an ECB study, it led to 
stabilization in markets as well as to an immediate and substantial decline of government 
bond yields. 
The Securities Markets Programme was not enough. The downgrades of euro area 
sovereign bonds, the slowing down of the European economy, and uncertainty regarding the 
effectiveness of the measures to tackle the euro area crisis increased the pressure on the 
government debt of euro area countries under financial assistance. In autumn 2011, the 
adverse interaction between government bonds and national banking systems raised concerns 
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about their viability, which once again rendered the interbank market dysfunctional.  
This situation worsened on 26 October 2011, when the Council agreed on a capital 
package proposed by the European Banking Authority (EBA), under which banks were 
required to build up additional capital buffers to reach a level of 9% Core Tier 1 capital. The 
objective of the exercise was to create an exceptional and temporary capital buffer to address 
market concerns over sovereign risk, which would provide a reassurance to markets about 
banks’ ability to withstand a range of shocks and still maintain adequate capital. Nevertheless, 
the results of the exercise showed that banks needed another €115 billion in total to reach the 
desired level, which created uncertainty about their capital adequacy and added to market 
turbulence. In this contest, in December 2011 the ECB response focused on providing banks 
with short term liquidity support and sufficient time to reach the desired capital level. It 
undertook the following actions: 
1. Two LTROs, one in December 2011 and one in February 2012, with a maturity of 
three years each: these LTROs of a total amount of around €1 trillion provided banks with 
liquidity over the medium term. According to the ECB, the bank participation in those 
operations proves that liquidity reached out even to small and very small banks, whose 
primary business is to refinance small and medium sized enterprises. 
2. Reduction in the minimum reserve ratio requirement from 2% to 1%, with the scope 
of reducing banks’ liquidity needs and thereby the amount of collateral that they may need 
to mobilize to satisfy reserve requirements, and to favor money market activity by 
increasing the incentives of banks with excess cash to offer their liquidity to other banks, 
as they can no longer deposit it with the fully remunerated reserve account. 
3. Increase in collateral availability: the ECB allowed NCBs to accept additional credit 
claims, in particular bank loans, as collateral. Since credit claims correspond to certain 
types of loans to households and firms, their eligibility as collateral allowed banks to 
access refinancing using these credit claims, which were directly related to their lending 
activity. 
4. Second Covered Bond Purchase Programme: finally, in November 2011, the 
Eurosystem launched a second Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP2). The 
programme ended, as planned, on 31 October 2012 when it reached a nominal amount of 
€16.4 billion. 
The end of 2011 and beginning of 2012 were tumultuous, with a proposed Greek 
referendum on the EU financing package and government crises in both Greece and Italy, as 
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well as with Standard & Poor’s downgrades of nine euro area sovereigns in January and their 
lowering the credit rating of 16 Spanish banks in April. The uncertainty created, which the 
Greek election in spring 2012 did not lessen, resulted in government bond yields of a number 
of euro area countries reaching new heights and starting to incorporate redenomination risk 
premiums, that is, the risk that those countries would exit the EMU and redenominate their 
public and private liabilities. 
Against this background, the ECB sent a strong signal to the markets, with its President 
declaring in a speech that the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. Then 
in September, the ECB announced the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) Programme, 
under which it was prepared to intervene along with NCBs in the secondary sovereign bond 
markets of euro area member countries. In this way, the ECB became a lender of last resort in 
the government bond markets, restoring financial market confidence, even though no 
operations have yet been conducted. 
The OMT Programme differed from the Securities Markets Programme in several ways. 
A condition for access to the OMT was “strict and effective conditionality attached to an 
appropriate European Financial Stability Facility / European Stability Mechanism 
programme”. The OMT programme would be, in principle, unlimited in time and scope. 
Finally, the ECB would be treated without preferential treatment with respect to other 
creditors. Furthermore, the transparency of OMT purchases would be greater since the 
breakdown by country and the average duration of holdings would be published. 
Mario Draghi’s declaration and the OMT programme have greatly reduced market 
volatility in the euro area. Sovereign bond yields in Spain and Italy fell by 100 and 50 basis 
points in August 2012. In addition, the bond spreads fell very significantly.  
Nevertheless, as 2012 ended and 2013 started, a new source of tension appeared. 
Inflation, which during the crisis had reached a peak of 3%, started decreasing, reaching 1.2% 
in April 2013. This disinflation, combined with the slow growth of the euro area economy, 
prompted the ECB to adopt another precautionary non-standard measure, namely, forward 
guidance. 
In July 2013, ECB President Draghi declared in a press conference that, “looking ahead, 
our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for as long as necessary. The 
Governing Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for 
an extended period of time”. This has been seen as the introduction by the ECB of forward 
guidance or “explicit statements by a central bank about the likely path of future policy rates 
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typically conditioned on the evolution of certain key macroeconomic aggregates”.  
According to Hubert and Labondance, the objective of the forward guidance is to 
influence private expectations about short term rates, which in turn will influence expectations 
about long term rates, in order to strengthen the transmission of monetary policy, and thus 
support the economy. Eggertsson and Woodford observe that this strategy is meant to 
complement quantitative easing and is especially relevant when policy rates are at, or close to, 
their effective lower bound, the normal channels of monetary policy transmission are 
impaired, or when there is exceptional uncertainty on the state of the economy.  
According to the ECB Executive Board Member Peter Praet, “the ECB’s forward 
guidance has contributed to more stable money market conditions and has helped to anchor 
market expectations more firmly. It also ensures that our monetary policy stance is not 
excessively vulnerable to shocks that are disconnected from the underlying economic and 
monetary conditions in the euro area”.  
1.2.2: The first TLTROs  7
5 June 2014 (Press release): The Governing Council decided to conduct a series of 
targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) with the purpose to improve bank 
lending to the euro area non-financial private sector, excluding loans to households for house 
purchase, over a window of two years.  
Counterparties are entitled to an initial TLTRO borrowing allowance (initial allowance) 
equal to 7% of the total amount of their loans to the euro area non-financial private sector, 
excluding loans to households for house purchase, outstanding on 30 April 2014. In two 
successive TLTROs to be conducted in September and December 2014, counterparties can 
borrow an amount that cumulatively does not exceed this initial allowance.  
Further TLTROs are conducted quarterly from March 2015 to June 2016. The additional 
amounts that can be borrowed by counterparties can cumulatively reach up to three times each 
counterparty’s net lending to the euro area non-financial private sector, excluding loans to 
households for house purchase, provided between 30 April 2014 and the respective allotment 
reference date (the most recent month for which net lending data are available for each 
TLTRO allotment) in excess of a specified benchmark. 
 Source: Press releases on monetary policy from the ECB website: https://7
www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/activities/mopo/html/index.en.html [Last access on 15 
January 2019]
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All TLTROs mature in September 2018. The interest rate on the TLTROs is fixed over 
the life of each operation at the rate on the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations (MROs) 
prevailing at the time of take-up plus a fixed spread of 10 basis points. Interest is paid in 
arrears when the borrowing is repaid. Starting 24 months after each TLTRO, counterparties 
have the option to repay any part of the amounts they were allotted in that TLTRO at a six-
monthly frequency. 
Counterparties that have borrowed under the TLTROs, and whose net lending to the 
euro area non-financial private sector, excluding loans to households for house purchase, in 
the period from 1 May 2014 to 30 April 2016 is below the benchmark, are required to pay 
back borrowings in September 2016. 
1.2.3: The Quantitative Easing program  8
To increase the ability of banks to expand their lending and finance economic growth, 
the ECB decided to launch two programmes, in October and November 2014, to revive 
particular segments: covered bonds and asset backed securities. The programmes, the third 
Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3) and the Asset Backed Securities Purchase 
Programme (ABSPP), were planned to last for at least two years. Their goal is to support 
financing conditions in the euro area, facilitate credit provision to the real economy and 
generate positive spillovers to other markets. On 13 February 2015, the purchases in the 
context of the ABSPP amounted to €2870 million and those for the CBPP3 to €45954 million. 
Inflation in the euro area in December 2014 was -0.2% and growth rates were low. At 
the same time, the key interest rates were close to zero, with the rate for the deposit facility at 
-0.2%. To contribute to reviving the euro area economy and raise inflation, bringing it back to 
the desired level of lower than but close to 2%, the ECB decided to pursue an Expanded Asset 
Purchase Programme (EAPP) on 22 January 2015. Similar unconventional measures were 
implemented by the bank of Japan in 2001 and by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
England since 2008. Although the names of the specific programmes and their details differ, 
they are commonly referred to as quantitative easing (QE), an unconventional form of 
monetary policy where a central bank creates new money to buy financial assets, like 
government bonds. 
Under QE, a central bank creates money and uses it to purchase financial assets from 
 See Delivorias (2015)8
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private investors such as banks, pension funds and insurance companies. This process is 
electronic and does not involve printing banknotes: the central bank creates money by 
increasing the credit in its own account. Under the programme, the ECB adds the purchase of 
“euro denominated investment grade securities issued by euro area governments and 
European institutions" to the ABSPP and the CBPP3. 
The combined monthly purchases under the three programmes were planned to amount 
to €60 billion. They started in March 2015 and were originally planned to be carried out for 
18 months or until a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation towards the ECB’s objective 
of lower but close to 2% is observed. The purchases will be based on the Eurosystem national 
central banks’ shares in the ECB’s capital key. They will be done in the secondary market and 
amounts purchased will never exceed one third of a country’s debt issuance, or 25% of any 
given issue. Certain additional eligibility criteria will be applied in the case of countries under 
an EU/IMF adjustment programme. Finally, with regard to the sharing of hypothetical losses, 
20% of the additional asset purchases will be subject to a regime of risk sharing. 
However, the programme has generated lively debate, because the results of the 
previous three major QE programmes have been mixed and because of concerns relating to its 
legality and to its feasibility. 
1.2.4: The second TLTROs  9
10 March 2016 (Press release): The Governing Council of the ECB decided to launch a 
new series of four TLTROs (TLTRO II). The new operations offer attractive long-term 
funding conditions to banks to further ease private sector credit conditions and to stimulate 
credit creation. TLTRO II is intended to reinforce the ECB’s accommodative monetary policy 
stance and to strengthen the transmission of monetary policy by further incentivizing bank 
lending to the real economy. Together with the other non-standard measures in place, TLTRO 
II contribute to a return of inflation rate to levels below, but close to, 2% over the medium 
term. 
Counterparties can borrow in the operations a total amount of up to 30% of a specific 
eligible part of their loans as at 31 January 2016, less any amount which was previously 
borrowed and still outstanding under the first two TLTRO operations conducted in 2014. The 
 Source: Press releases on monetary policy from the ECB website: https://9
www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/activities/mopo/html/index.en.html [Last access on 15 
January 2019]
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four TLTRO II operations are conducted in June, September and December 2016 and in 
March 2017. 
All TLTRO II operations have a maturity of four years from their settlement date. 
Counterparties can repay the amounts borrowed under TLTRO II at a quarterly frequency 
starting two years from the settlement of each operation. Counterparties are not subject to 
mandatory early repayments. 
The interest rate applied to TLTRO II is fixed for each operation at the rate applied in 
the main refinancing operations (MROs) prevailing at the time of allotment. In addition, 
counterparties whose eligible net lending in the period between 1 February 2016 and 31 
January 2018 exceeds their benchmark are charged a lower rate for the entire term of the 
operation. This lower rate is linked to the interest rate on the deposit facility prevailing at the 
time of the allotment of each operation. 
The Governing Council decided to introduce an additional voluntary repayment 
possibility for all currently outstanding TLTROs in June 2016, coinciding with the settlement 
of the first TLTRO II operation. This allows counterparties to roll over amounts borrowed 
under the current TLTROs into TLTRO II. The remaining two operations of the first TLTRO 
programme are implemented in March 2016 and June 2016, as originally scheduled. 
1.2.5: Monetary policy decisions about the QE program  10
22 January 2015 (Press release): The monthly purchases under the asset purchase 
programme will be €60 billion and will last until at least September 2016. 
3 December 2015 (Press conference): The monthly purchases are now intended to run 
until the end of March 2017, or beyond if necessary, and in any case until the Governing 
Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its aim of 
achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. The principal 
payments on the securities purchased under the APP will be reinvested as they mature, for as 
long as necessary. This will contribute both to favorable liquidity conditions and to an 
appropriate monetary policy stance. Euro-denominated marketable debt instruments issued by 
 Source: Governing Council monetary policy decisions from the ECB website: https://10
www.ecb.europa.eu/press/govcdec/mopo/2018/html/index.en.html [Last access on 15 
January 2019], Press releases on monetary policy from the ECB website: https://
www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/activities/mopo/html/index.en.html [Last access on 15 
January 2019], and: Press conferences from the ECB website: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
press/pressconf/2018/html/index.en.html [Last access on 15 January 2019]
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regional and local governments located in the euro area are included in the list of eligible 
assets for the PSPP. 
10 March 2016 (Governing Council decision): The monthly purchases under the asset 
purchase programme will be expanded to €80 billion starting in April 2016. 
2 June 2016 (Governing Council decision): On 8 June 2016 the Eurosystem will start 
making purchases under its corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP). 
8 December 2016 (Governing Council decision): From April 2017, the net asset 
purchases are intended to continue at a monthly pace of €60 billion until the end of December 
2017, or beyond, if necessary, and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained 
adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim. If in the meantime the 
outlook becomes less favorable or if financial conditions become inconsistent with further 
progress towards a sustained adjustment of the path of inflation, the Governing Council 
intends to increase the programme in terms of size and/or duration. The net purchases will be 
made alongside reinvestments of the principal payments from maturing securities purchased 
under the APP. 
26 October 2017 (Governing Council decision): From January 2018 the net asset 
purchases are intended to continue at a monthly pace of €30 billion until the end of September 
2018, or beyond, if necessary, and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained 
adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim. If the outlook becomes 
less favorable, or if financial conditions become inconsistent with further progress towards a 
sustained adjustment in the path of inflation, the Governing Council stands ready to increase 
the APP in terms of size and/or duration. The Eurosystem will reinvest the principal payments 
from maturing securities purchased under the APP for an extended period of time after the end 
of its net asset purchases, and in any case for as long as necessary. This will contribute both to 
favorable liquidity conditions and to an appropriate monetary policy stance. 
14 June 2018 (Governing Council decision): The Governing Council anticipates that, 
after September 2018, subject to incoming data confirming the Governing Council’s medium 
term inflation outlook, the monthly pace of the net asset purchases will be reduced to €15 
billion until the end of December 2018 and that net purchases will then end. The Governing 
Council intends to maintain its policy of reinvesting the principal payments from maturing 
securities purchased under the APP for an extended period of time after the end of the net 
asset purchases, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favorable liquidity 
conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation. 
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1.2.6: Other announcements of unconventional monetary policies  11
18 June 2015 (Press release): ECB Governing Council takes note of ruling on OMT. 
The Governing Council of the ECB takes note of the ruling of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ) confirming that the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
programme announced in 2012 is compatible with EU law and within the ECB’s 
competences. 
23 September 2015 (Press release): Eurosystem adjusts purchase process in ABS 
programme. The Governing Council of the ECB decided to increase the proportion of 
purchases by national central banks rather than external managers in the ABSPP, as 
announced when the programme was first launched. 
9 November 2015 (Press release): Increase in PSPP issue share limit enlarges 
purchasable universe. The PSPP issue share limit will be set at 33% per international 
securities identification number (ISIN), subject to verification on a case-by-case basis that a 
holding of 33% per ISIN would not lead the Eurosystem central banks to reach blocking 
minority holdings. 
10 March 2016 (Press release): ECB adds corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) 
to the asset purchase programme (APP) and announces changes to APP. 
21 April 2016 (Press release): ECB announces details of the corporate sector purchase 
programme (CSPP) 
3 May 2016 (Press release): ECB publishes legal acts relating to the second series of 
targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II). 
2 June 2016 (Press release): ECB announces remaining details of the corporate sector 
purchase programme (CSPP) 
8 December 2016 (Press release): Eurosystem introduces cash collateral for PSPP 
securities lending facilities. ECB adjusts parameters of its asset purchase programme (APP). 
15 December 2016 (Press release): Eurosystem adjusts purchase process in ABS 
purchase programme (ABSPP). 
26 October 2017 (Press release): Additional information on asset purchase programme. 
 Source: Press releases on monetary policy from the ECB website: https://11
www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/activities/mopo/html/index.en.html [Last access on 15 
January 2019]
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CHAPTER 2: THE MONETARY POLICY AND THE STOCK 
MARKET: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Given that this thesis is focused on the impact of unconventional monetary policies on 
stock returns of banks in the euro area, this chapter summarizes the main methodologies and 
findings of the literature. This chapter is divided into four sections, a first section about 
monetary policy and stock market, a second section about unconventional monetary policy 
and stock market, a third section about monetary policy and bank stocks, and a fourth section 
about unconventional monetary policy and bank stocks.  
The literature about the impact of unconventional monetary policy is not very wide with 
respect to the literature about the impact of conventional monetary policy, and also the 
literature about the impact on bank stocks is small with respect to the literature about the 
impact on the whole stock market. In each of the four sections, we will see in depth some of 
the main articles, and more briefly other articles. 
2.1: MONETARY POLICY AND STOCK MARKET 
There is a considerable amount of literature about the link between monetary policy and 
stock market. The importance of understanding this relationship is explained by Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005). In their paper they highlight that “the ultimate objectives of monetary policy 
are expressed in terms of macroeconomic variables such as output, employment, and inflation. 
However, …[the monetary policy directly affects financial markets, and then], by affecting 
asset prices and returns, policymakers try to modify economic behavior in ways that will help 
to achieve their ultimate objectives. Understanding the links between monetary policy and 
asset prices is …[very] important for understanding the policy transmission mechanism.” 
How stock prices should react to monetary policy? Thorbecke (1997) remembers that, 
according to the theory, “stock prices equal the expected present value of future net cash 
flows. Thus evidence that positive monetary shocks increase stock returns indicates that 
expansionary monetary policy exerts real effects by increasing future cash flows or by 
decreasing the discount factors at which those cash flows are capitalized”. In addition, 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) point out that “stocks are claims to real assets, so, if monetary 
neutrality holds, stock values should be independent of monetary policy in the very long run. 
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In the medium term, however, real and nominal volatility induced by the form of the 
monetary policy rule may well influence stock values.” 
Among the wide literature about this argument, in this section we will see some of the 
most cited articles about this topic. Different methods are employed by these papers to 
estimate the link between monetary policy and stock prices. Thorbecke (1997) uses three 
methods: a VAR, a linear regression and an event study. Rigobon and Sack (2002) introduced 
a methodology, the “identification through heteroskedasticity”, to solve the problems of 
omitted variables and simultaneous determination of asset prices and monetary policy. This 
methodology is used also by Bohl et al. (2008). Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) use an event 
study, and introduced a method to separate the expected and unexpected component of the 
policy rate change. A lot of papers use this method, such as Bredin et al. (2009). Bjørnland 
and Leitemo (2005) use a VAR methodology, which has an important difference with respect 
to the event study. Indeed, according to Huston and Spencer (2016), even if “event studies 
reduce the risk of both omitted variable bias and endogeneity problems …[, this method looks 
only] at the immediate market reactions to policy actions …[and, unlike the VAR, it cannot 
detect] longer term effects”. 
The majority of papers analyze the impact on US by the Federal Reserve (Fed). Few 
papers treat other countries, such as Bohl et al. (2008), which analyzes the impact on Europe, 
and Bredin et al. (2009), which analyzes and compares the impact on UK and Germany, in a 
period that comprises the transition to the EU, so the German monetary policy is replaced by 
the ECB monetary policy starting from 1999. 
Besides estimating the impact of monetary policy on stock market, some articles find 
other interesting results. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Bredin et al. (2009), and Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2004), find that the impact is different across sectors. Bernanke and Kuttner 
(2005) notice that the impact of monetary policy on expected future excess equity returns is 
the main reason of the impact on stock returns. Thorbecke (1997), and Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2004), find that the impact differs between individual firms depending on their 
characteristics, for example both papers agree that firms with a small size are more affected 
by monetary policy. Bomfim (2003) analyze the impact of monetary policy on the volatility of 
stock markets, finding that the volatility increases after a surprise in the policy rate change. 
In the continuation of this section we will see more in-depth some of the main articles, 
and more shortly some other articles. 
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2.1.1: Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) 
The paper of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) uses Federal funds futures data to distinguish 
between expected and unexpected policy actions. Since the expected actions should be 
already incorporated into prices, only unexpected actions should have an effect on the market. 
“For an event taking place on day d of month m, the unexpected … target funds rate 
change can be calculated from the change in the rate implied by the current-month futures 
contract. But because the contract’s settlement price is based on the monthly average Federal 
funds rate, the change in the implied futures rate must be scaled up by a factor related to the 
number of days in the month affected by the change: Δiu = D/(D-d) * (f0m,d - f0m,d-1), where Δiu 
is the unexpected target rate change, f0m,d is the current month futures rate, and D is the 
number of days in the month. The expected component of the rate change is defined as the 
actual change minus the surprise…[that is:] Δie = Δi - Δiu.” 
Two regressions are run with the CRSP value weighted return as the dependent variable. 
In the first regression, this variable is regressed on the raw change in the Federal funds rate 
target, instead in the second regression it is regressed on the expected and unexpected 
components. The regressions are run only for the days with a change in the target rate and 
days of meetings of the FOMC. 
The raw target rate change has a negative but not significant coefficient. In the second 
regression, “however, the estimated stock market response to the …[surprise component] is 
negative and highly significant”, with a change in the surprise component of 1% point causing 
a one-day return of 4.68% with the opposite sign of the change. When six outliers are 
eliminated, the response is smaller even if still significant (2.55%). 
They find other additional results. Firstly, the market responds more “to policy changes 
that are perceived to be relatively more permanent…[, and less to] unexpected inaction … of 
FOMC”. Secondly, the reactions to monetary policy surprises are different across industries, 
“with the high tech and telecommunications sectors… [being more affected, and] other 
sectors, such as energy and utilities,… [not] significantly affected by monetary policy”. 
The effect of monetary policy on expected future excess equity returns is found to be 
the main reason of the impact on equity returns. Revisions in cash flow forecasts have some 
effects, and changes in expected real interest rates have a very small effect. 
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2.1.2: Rigobon and Sack (2002) 
The paper of Rigobon and Sack (2002) proposes a methodology to solve “the two main 
problems in estimating the interactions between monetary policy and asset prices…[, namely] 
the endogeneity of the variables and the existence of omitted variables. First, while asset 
prices are influenced by the short-term interest rate, the short-term interest rate is 
simultaneously affected by asset prices, primarily through their influence on monetary policy 
expectations. Second, […] other variables influence both asset prices and short-term interest 
rates”. 
This article uses “a technique called identification through heteroschedasticity”. “To 
implement this approach, […] two subsamples [are identified], denoted F and ˜F, […] for 
which […] the following assumptions […] hold: [the variance of the monetary policy shock is 
greater in the subsample F and the variance of the asset price shock and of the omitted 
variables are equal between the two subsamples], conditions […] weaker than… [those] 
required …[for] the event-study approach.” 
The days of FOMC meeting are the subsample F, and the days before them are the 
subsample ˜F, in fact the monetary policy shock has a bigger variance on days of meetings, 
and the other variables should have a relatively constant variance. The identification is 
possible through the variance covariance matrices of the two subsamples. This approach can 
be implemented simply using instrumental variables. 
The sample size is 3 January 1994 - 26 November 2001, with a total of 78 policy dates. 
The results show that “a 25 basis point increase in the three-month interest rate results in a 
1.9% decline in the S&P 500 index and a 2.5% decline in the Nasdaq index. …[In addition,] 
the short term rate has a significant positive impact on market interest rates, with the largest 
effect on rates with shorter maturities.” 
2.1.3: Thorbecke (1997) 
The article of Thorbecke (1997) studies the link between stock returns and monetary 
policy in the US using three different methods. The period analyzed is January 1967 - 
December 1990.  
The first method is “a monthly VAR with [the following variables:] the growth rate of 
industrial production, the inflation rate, the log of a commodity price index, the federal funds 
 30
rate, the log of nonborrowed reserves, the log of total reserves, stock returns, a constant, and 
six lags[…]. Since the Federal Reserve targeted nonborrowed reserves …[from] October 1979 
…[to] August 1982 […] orthogonalized innovations in NBR are used to measure monetary 
policy over this period.” 
The second method is a regression of the industry stock return on the following 
variables: “the Treasury bond / Treasury bill spread (the horizon premium), the corporate 
bond / Treasury bond spread (the default premium), the monthly growth rate in industrial 
production, unexpected inflation, and the change in expected inflation”, and “an index that 
classifies monetary policy into five categories: strongly anti inflationary (-2), anti inflationary 
(-1), neutral (0), pro growth (1) and strongly pro growth (2)”. 
The third method is an event study. The percentage changes in the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJIA) and the Dow Jones Composite Average (DJCA) are regressed on the change 
in percentage points of the federal funds rate, for those days with news of a federal funds rate 
change. 
“Using several measures of monetary policy and a variety of empirical techniques, this 
article presents evidence that monetary policy exerts large effects on ex ante and ex post stock 
returns. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that monetary policy, at least in the 
short run, has real and quantitatively important effects on real variables. …[Moreover, the 
impact is bigger] on small firms than [on] large firms. This evidence supports the hypothesis 
that monetary policy matters partly because it affects firms’ access to credit”. 
2.1.4: Other papers about monetary policy and stock market 
Bohl et al. (2008) analyze the impact of monetary policy shock on European stock 
market returns. The method used is the identification through heteroskedasticity of Rigobon 
and Sack (2002). The period considered is 1 January 1999 to 28 February 2007. The impact 
found is a decrease between 1.42% and 2.30% in response to an unanticipated increase of 25 
basis points in the interest rate. In addition, the impact is similar between the main stock 
markets of the EMU. 
Bredin et al. (2009) use the approach of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) to separate 
expected and unexpected change in the policy rate. They analyze the impact of monetary 
policy on stock returns for UK and Germany. The sample is May 1989 - May 2004 for 
Germany (so it includes the transition to the EU) and January 1993 - May 2004 for UK. 
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“Results show that the UK monetary policy surprises have had a statistically significant 
impact on both the UK aggregate and industry level stock returns. […] The sectors that 
respond to domestic monetary policy changes […] are similar [in UK and US. In addition,] 
unanticipated changes in the UK monetary policy have significant impacts on German 
aggregate and industrial level stock returns. […] However, the results for German / Euro area 
monetary policy surprises are […] different. […] Both expected and unexpected changes in 
…[the policy rate] have an insignificant impact on stock returns in Germany and the UK. …
[In summary,] equity markets in the UK and Germany are sensitive to […] the monetary 
policy […] of the Bank of England, but are ambivalent to the decisions of the ECB”. 
Bjørnland and Leitemo (2005) “estimate the interdependence between US monetary 
policy and the S&P 500 using structural VAR methodology …[with] a combination of short-
run and long-run restrictions. …[Results show that] stock prices immediately fall by 1.5% due 
to a monetary policy shock that raises the federal funds rate by 10 basis points, …[and] a 
stock price shock increasing stock prices by 1% leads to an increase in the interest rate of 5 
basis points”. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) analyze “the effects of US monetary policy on stock 
markets [, from 1994 to 2003. They] find that, on average, a tightening of 50 basis points 
reduces returns by about 3%. Moreover, returns react more strongly when no change had been 
expected, when there is a directional change in the monetary policy stance and during periods 
of high market uncertainty. […] Individual stocks [reaction is] highly heterogeneous …[, and 
the reaction of individual stocks depends on] financial constraints and Tobin’s q. First, […] 
there are strong industry-specific effects of US monetary policy. Second, […] for the 
individual stocks comprising the S&P 500 those with low cashflows, small size, poor credit 
ratings, low debt to capital ratios, high price-earnings ratios or high Tobin’s q are affected 
significantly more. [Moreover, both] firm- and industry-specific effects […] play an important 
role”. 
Bomfim (2003) studies “pre-announcement and news effects on the stock market in the 
context of public disclosure of monetary policy decisions. The results suggest that the stock 
market tends to be relatively quiet - conditional volatility is abnormally low - on days 
preceding regularly scheduled policy announcements. [This effect is significant only after the] 
changes in the Federal Reserve’s disclosure practices in early 1994. …[The monetary policy 
surprise] tends to boost stock market volatility significantly in the short run, and positive 
surprises […] tend to have a larger effect on volatility than negative surprises”. 
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2.2: UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY AND STOCK PRICES 
In this section we consider some of the main articles about the impact of unconventional 
monetary policy on stock prices. These articles focus on different currency areas where 
unconventional monetary policies were decided. Huston and Spencer (2016) and Rosa (2012) 
focus on the US, Nakazono and Ikeda (2016) and Honda (2014) on Japan, Joyce et al. (2010) 
on UK, Haitsma et al. (2016) and Fratzscher et al. (2014) on euro area, Gambacorta et al. 
(2014) and Rogers et al. (2014) on more than one currency area. 
Huston and Spencer (2016), Honda (2014), and Gambacorta et al. (2014) use a VAR 
model. The variables of unconventional monetary policy on Huston and Spencer (2016) are 
the monetary base, excess reserves, and M2, Honda (2014) uses the total balance of bank 
reserves (TBBR), and Gambacorta et al. (2014) use the central bank’s assets.  
Nakazono and Ikeda (2016), Haitsma et al. (2016), Rogers et al. (2014) and Rosa (2012) 
use an event study. To identify the unconventional monetary policy, Nakazono and Ikeda 
(2016) use Euroyen future rates, Haitsma et al. (2016) and Rogers et al. (2014) use the spread 
between German and Italian 10-year government bonds, Rosa (2012) uses Financial Times 
articles. 
Haitsma et al. (2016) analyzes also how the results are affected by the firm’s 
characteristics. In addition, this paper and Rosa (2012) study the impact of both conventional 
and unconventional monetary policy. Fratzscher et al. (2014) and Rogers et al. (2014) find 
spillover effects, that is unconventional monetary policies in a currency area which affect 
stock prices in other currency areas. 
The articles on this topic are quite recent, since unconventional monetary policies are a 
tool used recently. In the continuation of this section we will see more in-depth some of the 
main articles, and more shortly some other articles. In particular, we will see deeply the paper 
of Haitsma et al. (2016), since the methodology of this thesis is based on this paper. 
2.2.1: Huston and Spencer (2016) 
The paper of Huston and Spencer (2016) “explores the effectiveness of the Fed’s actions 
to increase asset prices and thus enable the wealth effect.”. The method used is a vector 
autoregression (VAR). The sample is September 2008 - March 2016. “The traditional measure 
of monetary policy is the federal funds rate …[, but from the end of 2008] the policy rate has 
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been near zero and thus not useful. […] Other potential measures include the monetary base, 
money supply and excess reserves”. 
The VAR variables are the monetary base as the monetary policy variable, the S&P 
Case-Shiller 10-city home price index, the real value of the S&P 500 index, the 30-year 
conventional mortgage rate, the civilian unemployment rate, and the index of S&P 500 
volatility (VIX). This six-variables VAR model has two lags. 
“The trends [of the impulse response functions] are as expected for all five impulse 
responses to a change in the monetary base: an increase in the monetary base increases stock 
values and housing prices. It reduces unemployment, volatility and the mortgage rate. The 
effects on the S&P 500 VIX and unemployment are significant at the 5% level though the 
effect on the VIX attenuates. The Case-Shiller index becomes significant only starting at the 
two year mark. Mortgage rates fall but are not statistically significant”. 
“To explore the relative importance of Fed policy in affecting asset prices, a variance 
decomposition is performed with a 24-month forecast horizon. […] In the early months, 
shocks to the SP500R’s own equation error term dominate, but over the 24-month period the 
share of S&P 500 forecast error variance attributed to changes in the monetary base rises to 
over 40%, far above the other factors. For housing prices, the role played by monetary base 
shocks is more modest. The proportion assigned to the monetary base still rises over time but 
at 24 months is just over 12%. For the [other] three variables […], monetary-base shocks 
claim the highest percent of forecast error variance for unemployment at 31.1%. A peak of 
16.7% is reached for the monetary base share for the VIX at 21 months. Consistent with the 
insignificant impulse response, the monetary base share of forecast variance error for the 
mortgage rate is only 7.7%”. 
In summary, “this study finds that the expansionary monetary policy …[on the period 
investigated] has been quite effective. […] The ability of these programs to raise asset prices 
is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for monetary policy to affect spending through 
increased wealth”. 
2.2.2: Nakazono and Ikeda (2016) 
The paper of Nakazono and Ikeda (2016) “evaluates the effects of unconventional 
monetary policies adopted by the Bank of Japan from the year 2001 to 2006”. The dataset 
consists of stocks “listed in the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange […] from April 
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2001 to February 2006”. Log intraday returns are computed only for days of monetary policy 
meetings.  
“[The] unconventional monetary policy shock …[is computed] as follows: MPStSpread = 
Δf6,t - Δf1,t, where Δfk,t is the change between the opening and the closing futures rate (100 
minus the futures contract price) of the kth nearest month Euroyen futures in day t when the 
monetary policy meeting is held”. 
“Note that whether a policy is expansionary or contractionary is not determined by what 
the Bank of Japan does …[, but] by whether the Bank of Japan beats markets’ expectations. If 
market participants expect monetary easing and the Bank of Japan maintains the existing 
policy, the policy is considered as contractionary even when the Bank of Japan does not 
change the policy”. 
The intraday returns of TOPIX (Japanese stock index) are regressed on the monetary 
policy surprise. Results show that “an expansionary monetary policy shock decreases the 
stock index return …[, contrasting] with the literature”. 
Dividing the sample into recession (April 2001 - December 2001), and boom (January 
2002 - February 2006), “a contractionary monetary policy surprise decreases TOPIX returns 
during the recession …[even if] not significantly …[, but] during the boom …[it] increases 
the stock index significantly”. Results are confirmed by a regression with a dummy for the 
recession and one for the boom (the explanatory variables are MPStSpread * DtRecession and 
MPStSpread * DtBoom). 
As in the previous equation, the sample is split into two parts, this time into tightening 
and easing. An unexpected tightening increases stock prices, and an easing decreases stock 
prices, inconsistent with the theory. 
“In October 2003, the Bank of Japan gave more detailed description of the commitment 
to maintaining accommodative monetary conditions and quantitative easing policy until 
inflation rates reach above zero …[, enhancing] monetary policy transparency. To examine 
whether enhancing monetary policy transparency has any effect on the reaction of the stock 
market, [the regression which divides the sample into tightening and easing is run further 
dividing the sample into before and after October 2003]”. 
“Until October 2003, the response is negative when a monetary policy surprise is 
contractionary or expansionary. That is, stock prices fluctuate and become volatile in response 
to any policy surprises. After that, however, the reaction is not dependent on the monetary 
policy shock: an unexpected monetary policy easing (tightening) decreases (increases) stock 
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returns. […] The reaction is not consistent with economic theory”. 
2.2.3: Haitsma et al. (2016) 
The paper of Haitsma et al. (2016) employs an event study to “examine how stock 
markets respond to the policies of the European Central Bank during 1999-2015”. “The 
following model [is estimated]: 
Rit = α + β1(1-Ct)Δrtu + 𝛾1(1-Ct)Δrte + β2CtΔrtu + 𝛾2CtΔrte + φΔrtu,c + ẟXt + εt 
where Rti represents the returns on day t of a certain stock index or portfolio i […], α is 
a constant, Ct is a dummy that takes a value of zero before the crisis and one thereafter, Δrtu, 
Δrte, Δrtu,c are respectively the conventional monetary policy surprise, the expected policy rate 
change, and the unconventional monetary policy surprise on day t […], Xt is a vector of 
control variables on day t, and εt is the error term on day t. β1 represents the effects of the 
[conventional] monetary policy surprise on stock returns pre-crisis, whereas β2 shows the 
effects after the start of the crisis. […] The vector of control variables Xt consists of two 
variables: the MSCI World index (excluding Europe) to control for general economic 
movements in the rest of the world and the crisis dummy. […] The ECB’s announcement of 
the first unconventional monetary policy on 22 August 2007 …[represents] the start of the 
crisis period”. 
The returns are log returns. “The stock market index used is the EURO STOXX 50 
index. […] For sector indices […] the 19 ‘supersectors’ [are used], as defined by the 
International Classification Benchmark”. According to the interest rate channel, “the response 
to monetary policy surprises should differ across sectors depending on the interest-elasticity 
of the demand for their products”. 
“The credit channel implies that sectors will be more affected by monetary policy 
surprises, the stronger their dependence on bank funding”. “Several portfolios [are identified] 
based on firm characteristics to examine the credit channel. First, for size […] the Datastream 
portfolios for the euro area, i.e. EURO STOXX Large, Mid and Small. Second, …[the 
following indices are considered]: the interest coverage ratio, the free cash flow to income 
ratio, the current ratio, the financial leverage ratio, and the debt-to-equity ratio. …[For each of 
these characteristics, stocks are divided] into three groups: high, mid and low, and […] the 
average daily returns [are computed for each group of stocks]”.  
Finally, other two characteristics are considered, “namely value versus growth stocks 
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and momentum. A value stock …[has] a low market-to-book and price-to-earnings ratio…[, 
and] the opposite holds for a growth stock. […] For the momentum factor …[, stocks are 
sorted] based on past performance […], i.e. one month, three months and twelve months”. 
The method of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) is used to separate expected and 
unexpected component of the conventional monetary policy rate. The “continuous three-
month Euribor futures rates …[are employed] to construct …[a] proxy for conventional 
monetary policy surprises: Δrtu = fs,t - fs,t-1, where Δrtu represents the policy surprise at day t, 
and fs,t - fs,t-1 [is the difference between the future rate at day t and t-1]. […] The expected part 
of the policy change (Δrte) …[is] the difference between the actual rate change (Δrt) and the 
unexpected part […]: Δrte= Δrt -Δrtu”. 
“To measure unexpected unconventional policies, …[this article follows] Rogers et al. 
(2014) who proxy the surprise by the change in the spread between German and Italian 10-
year bond yields. If the spread increases following an unconventional monetary policy 
announcement it implies that monetary policy is tighter than expected and vice versa. The 
surprise factor for the unconventional measures …[is:] Δrtu,c = (yIs,t -yGs,t ) - (yIs,t-1 -yIs,t-1 ), 
where yIs,t and yGs,t are the Italian and German 10-year government bond yields at day t 
respectively”. The spread is used since “the ECB’s unconventional monetary policies were to 
quite some extent aimed at reducing intra-euro area sovereign spreads”. 
The Governing Council meeting dates are used as the conventional monetary policy 
days. “The unconventional measures taken by the ECB in recent years did not always 
correspond to the regular announcement dates. […] For these announcements, …[the dates 
used are taken from] Rogers et al. (2014) for the period up to April 2014 and the database of 
press release of the ECB up to and including February 2015”. 
“[Results] show that both conventional and unconventional monetary policy surprises 
affect the EURO STOXX 50 index. The strongest effects are found for unconventional 
monetary policy surprises. …[Moreover,] results do not provide strong evidence for the 
interest rate channel. Although stocks of different sectors respond differently to monetary 
policy surprises, these differences are hardly linked to differences with respect to their 
sensitivity to interest rates. […] Value stocks are affected more by unconventional monetary 
policy surprises than growth stocks. The effects on value and growth stocks are fairly similar 
for conventional policy surprises. For portfolios constructed on the basis of momentum, […] 
loser stocks react more strongly to unconventional monetary policy surprises”. 
“The impact […] differs across the crisis and non crisis period. During the crisis, 
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unexpected conventional monetary policy tightening is frequently associated with higher 
stock prices although the coefficients are insignificant in most cases. In addition, Wald tests 
frequently suggest a change in the effects of conventional monetary policy before and after 
the crisis”. 
2.2.4: Honda (2014) 
The paper by Honda (2014) summarizes the VAR findings of a paper from Honda and 
Tachibana in 2011. The sample period is January 1996-March 2010. Four dummy variables 
are used: d1 equal to 1 during the QE period, d2 equal to 1 before and after the QE (d2 is 1 
when d1 is 0 and vice versa), d3 equal to 1 before the QE and d4 equal to 1 after the QE. 
Three kinds of VAR models are considered. The first model’s variables are prices, 
production, the overnight call rate, stock prices, and finally TBBR (total balance of bank 
reserves) multiplied by d1. The second model adds to the previous model the variable 
TBBR*d2. The third model, starting from the second model, substitutes TBBR*d2 with 
TBBR*d3 and TBBR*d4, to allow TBBR to have a different effect before and after the QE. 
Impulse response function to a quantitative easing policy shock are computed. “In all 
three models, the responses in prices […] are negligible, but those in production […] and 
stock prices are significantly different from zero. Stock prices react within 1 to 6 months, but 
production reacts with a time lag of 7 to 9 months. […] The main message […] is that 
nontraditional monetary policy as a package has significant impacts on production through 
changes in stock prices”. 
2.2.5: Other papers about unconventional monetary policy and stock market 
Joyce et al. (2010) evaluate the impact of the QE on asset prices in UK (then not only 
stocks). They find that the QE policy reduced gilt (UK government securities) yields by about 
100 basis points. “The […] impact on other asset prices is more difficult to disentangle from 
other influences”. 
Rosa (2012) “examines the impact of large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) on US asset 
prices […] using an event study. [The assets considered are bonds, stocks and exchange rates.] 
The surprise component of LSAP announcements is identified from Financial Times articles. 
[…] Results show that the LSAP news has economically large and highly significant effects 
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on asset prices, even after controlling for the [conventional] surprise component […] and 
communication about its future path of policy”. 
Fratzscher et al. (2014) measure “the impact of the most important ECB’s non-standard 
monetary policy measures on asset prices in the euro area and globally. …[For a period from 
May 2007 to September 2012,] results show that ECB policies …[positively affected] asset 
prices [both in the euro area and on other advanced and emerging economies]”. 
Gambacorta et al. (2014) use a panel VAR to evaluate “the macroeconomic effects of 
unconventional monetary policies …[on] eight advanced economies. …[The VAR variables 
are output, prices, VIX (volatility index) and the central bank assets.] An exogenous increase 
in central bank balance sheets at the zero lower bound leads to a temporary rise in economic 
activity and consumer prices. The estimated output effects …[are] similar to …[what can be] 
found in the literature on the effects of conventional monetary policy, while the impact on the 
price level is weaker and less persistent”. 
Rogers et al. (2014) evaluate “the effects of unconventional monetary policy by the 
Federal Reserve, Bank of England, European Central Bank and Bank of Japan on bond yields, 
stock prices and exchange rates. […] These policies are effective in easing financial 
conditions […] at the zero lower bound …[through reductions in the] term premia”. “The 
pass-through from bond yields into other asset prices generally seems to be bigger for the US 
than for other countries. There are also important cross-country spillovers, but they are 
asymmetric …[, with] the effects of US monetary policy shocks on non-US yields […] larger 
than the other way round”. 
2.3: MONETARY POLICY AND BANK STOCKS 
In this section we consider some of the main articles which study the relationship 
between monetary policy and stock prices of banks. In addition to estimate how bank stocks 
are affected by monetary policy, Flannery and James (1984) and Kwan (1991) find that the 
maturity composition of assets and liabilities affects the interest rate sensitivity of bank 
stocks. Madura and Schnusenberg (2000) and Yin and Yang (2013) analyze also how bank 
characteristics affect the interest rate sensitivity of bank stocks. 
Some articles of the literature, such as Flannery and James (1984), Chance and Lane 
(1980), Lynge and Zumwalt (1980), Booth and Officer (1985) and Akella and Chen (1990) 
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extend the CAPM to include, beyond the equity market return, a bond market return, to 
measure the interest rate sensitivity of bank stock returns. Also Madura and Schnusenberg 
(2000) and Yin and Yang (2013) extend the CAPM in a similar way, but instead of a bond 
market return they include the change in the actual and unexpected policy rate, respectively. 
Chance and Lane (1980) find that, when taking into account the market return, the 
interest rate does not explain the stock returns of financial institutions. Lynge and Zumwalt 
(1980) instead find that “bank common stock returns are sensitive to debt returns …[, and 
they are] more [sensitive] than […] industrial common stock returns”. 
As stated by Booth and Officer (1985), “a possible explanation for the conflicting 
results is due to differences in procedures for the orthogonalizing changes in interest rates and 
the market return”. Booth and Officer (1985) use “a pooled cross section time series model …
[to obtain] more powerful statistical tests of the significance of interest rate influence”. The 
results show that “[bank] stocks show extra-market sensitivity to actual, anticipated and 
unanticipated changes in short-term interest rates. …[This sensitivity is not found] in the 
portfolio of non financial securities, …[so] bank securities are more interest rate sensitive 
than non financial securities”. 
Akella and Chen (1990) find that “the interest rate sensitivity of bank stock returns […] 
depends on the econometric specification and the period considered”, and the sensitivity is 
found only for long term interest rates, rather than for short term rates. 
Kwan (1991) uses “a random coefficient two-index model for commercial bank stock 
returns, …[and finds] that commercial bank stock returns are significantly interest rate 
sensitive. The effect of interest rate changes on bank stock returns is found to be positively 
related to the maturity mismatch between the bank’s assets and liabilities”. 
Elyasiani and Mansur (1998) use a “generalized autoregressive conditionally 
heteroskedastic in the mean (GARCH-M) methodology to investigate the effect of interest 
rate and its volatility on the bank stock return generation process …[, to remove] the 
restrictive assumptions of linearity, independence and constant conditional variance in 
modeling bank stock returns. …[Results show that the] interest rate and …[its] volatility […] 
directly impact the first and the second moments of bank stock returns distribution, 
respectively”. 
The difference in the methodology used by articles of many years ago and a recent 
paper, that is Yin and Yang (2013), is the use of the unexpected component of the change in 
the policy rate, computed with the methodology introduced by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). 
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In the continuation of this section we will see more in-depth some of the main articles. 
2.3.1: Flannery and James (1984) 
The paper of Flannery and James (1984) “examines the relation between the interest 
rate sensitivity of common stock returns and the maturity composition of the firm’s nominal 
contracts”. 
“The nominal return on the [firm’s] stock […] is […] a weighted average of the returns 
on the firm’s nominal and real assets”. “Nominal assets are simply assets with cash flows that 
are fixed in nominal terms […], while the cash flows generated by real assets fluctuate with 
the price level. […] The nominal contracting hypothesis postulates that, […] since 
unanticipated inflation […] affects the real value of nominal but not real assets, stockholders 
of firms with fewer nominal assets than nominal liabilities should benefit from unexpected 
inflation”. 
“The interest rate sensitivity of a firm’s common stock returns will depend upon the 
firm’s holdings of net nominal assets […] and the[ir] maturity composition. […] The higher 
the proportion of the net nominal assets and the longer the[ir] maturity […], [the higher 
should be the firm’s sensitivity]”. 
For each bank in the sample, its stock return is regressed on the return of an equally 
weighted portfolio of stocks and on the return of an index of constant maturity default free 
bonds. The coefficient of the latter variable is the estimate of the interest rate sensitivity. This 
estimated sensitivity is then regressed on the ratio between the net short position and the 
average market value, representing the maturity composition. 
The results show “a negative and statistically significant relation […] between …[the] 
measure of bank rate sensitivity and the bank’s net short asset position”. The evidence from 
this article “supports the hypothesis that the effect of nominal interest rate changes on 
common stock prices is related to the maturity composition of a firm’s net nominal asset 
holding”. 
2.3.2: Madura and Schnusenberg (2000) 
The paper of Madura and Schnusenberg (2000) has two objectives. “The primary 
objective is to investigate the stock price reaction of commercial banks to announced changes 
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in the relevant policy tool by the Federal Reserve. […] The second objective is to investigate 
…[how this reaction depends on] financial characteristics of these banks”. 
“Over time, the Fed has followed various operating procedures. Three operating 
regimes are investigated in this article: […] interest rate targeting …[(September 1974 to] 
October 1979), […] reserves targeting (October 1979 to August 1987) and […] a new phase 
of interest rate targeting (August 1987 …[to December 1996)]”. The following analysis is 
done for each period. 
The portfolio return of commercial banks is regressed on the return on the S&P 500 
index and on the change in the target rate orthogonalized with respect to the market return. In 
a second regression, it is added the change in the target rate multiplied by a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if there is a discount rate announcement (target federal funds rate announcement in 
the reserves targeting period). After that, the change in the target rate is split into positive and 
negative changes, and the previous two regressions are run for positive and then for negative 
changes. 
“Results provide strong evidence of an inverse relation between changes in the Fed’s 
relevant policy tools and bank equity returns during each of the three periods of Fed operating 
procedures examined. Furthermore, …[results] provide […] evidence on an asymmetric effect 
of interest rate change: [only] decreases in the relevant interest rate result in a [significant] 
change in bank equity returns in the opposite direction”.  
According to the authors of the paper, “these results may be attributed to banks’ 
adjusting deposit rates faster than lending rates in response to reductions in the Fed’s relevant 
policy tool …[, or] to a higher elasticity of loan demand in response to a decrease in interest 
rates than to an increase in interest rates”.  
Another result is that “the simultaneous change of both policy tools does not transmit 
additional information about the Fed’s future intentions”. Note, however, that the models do 
not distinguish rate changes between expected and unexpected components. 
“To investigate whether the [sensitivity depends on] bank-specific characteristics, …
[banks are divided] in each period into three portfolios based on one of the characteristics 
being investigated”. 
The six regressions considered before (baseline model, only positive changes, only 
negative changes, and these three models with the dummy) are estimated for three bank 
portfolios (small, medium and large) over each of the three periods using seemingly unrelated 
regressions. Moreover, it is tested if the differences between coefficients of the three 
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portfolios are significant. Three portfolios are formed based on the market value of equity, and 
other three portfolios on the capital ratio, that is equity divided by total assets. 
Results show that “values of larger commercial banks and low capital ratio commercial 
banks are more exposed to changes in the relevant Fed policy tool”. 
2.3.3: Yin and Yang (2013) 
The paper of Yin and Yang (2013) “investigates how bank characteristics affect bank 
stock reactions to changes in the federal funds rate target”.  
The daily return of bank stocks is regressed on the unexpected component of target rate 
change, and on the S&P 500 daily return orthogonalized with respect to the unexpected target 
rate changes, which works as a control variable. The regression is run only for days of 
announcement of change in the federal funds rate target. The method of Bernanke and Kuttner 
(2005) is used to extract the unexpected component of the target change. The panel data set 
consists of 401 US banks in the period October 1988 - December 2007. 
The coefficient of the unexpected target rate change “measures the reaction of bank 
stock returns to the unexpected changes in the federal funds rate target”. The objective is to 
estimate how this reaction depends on four bank characteristics: bank size, business activity 
mix, funding sources and bank soundness. Now let’s see how bank characteristics are 
expected to influence the sensitivity to interest rate changes. 
Bank size: “Stocks of small nonfinancial firms are more affected than stocks of large 
firms by monetary shocks …[since] large firms are better collateralized and thus …[less 
sensitive to the interest rate risk]. However, […] large banks rely more on the federal funds 
market for financing …[Moreover,] large banks also borrow heavily with other money market 
instruments. These short-term borrowings in money markets are not covered by federal 
deposit insurance and, therefore, are more interest rate sensitive”. So, large banks should be 
more sensitive than small banks to a rate change. 
Business activity mix: The literature shows that nonbanking activities or non interest 
income sources are more interest rate risk sensitive than banking activities. So, banks which 
rely more on nonbanking businesses should be more sensitive to target rate changes. 
Funding sources: “since nondeposit funding is normally excluded from deposit 
insurance, [it is more interest rate risk sensitive]”. So, banks which rely more on non deposit 
funding sources should be more sensitive to target rate changes. 
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Bank soundness indicators: “Solvency and adequate capital help banks better withstand 
market shocks and make bank stocks less susceptible to changes in the federal funds rate 
target. Hence, […] banks […] more financially sound …[should be] less affected by 
unexpected changes in the federal funds rate target”. 
Two measures for each bank characteristic are used. “Bank size [is measured] with the 
natural logarithm of number of employees (Employees) and the natural logarithm of total 
assets (Total assets). […] Business activity mix [is measured] with the income mix, [that is] 
net interest income as a percentage of total operating income (Net interest income share), and 
the assets mix, that is the share of lending assets as a percentage of total earning assets (Loan 
share). The diversity of funding sources is measured as the share of total deposit to total 
liability (Deposit share) and the share of non deposit short term funding to total deposits and 
short term funding (nondeposit funding share). […] Bank soundness [is measured] by the 
capital to asset ratio (Capital) and the Z-score, […] defined as (ROA+CAR)/SROA, where 
ROA is a bank’s return on assets, CAR represents its capital to asset ratio and SROA stands 
for standard deviation of return on assets. …[It is used] Ln(1+Z-score) […] to smooth out 
higher values of the Z-scores in the dataset”. 
The impact of the characteristics is estimated with two methods. The first method 
consists of adding to the basic regression the product of the unexpected target rate change and 
the value of the characteristic. The second method is the categorical analysis, that is “for each 
bank characteristic …[banks are ranked] in ascending order and …[divided] equally into 10 
bins”, and for each bin the sensitivity coefficient of the basic regression is estimated. 
Results provide strong evidence that large banks are more interest rate sensitive than 
small banks, which “provides at least partial explanation for the demise of large US banks 
during the 2008 financial crisis, which followed a series of federal funds rate target increases 
prior to 2008”.  
There is no conclusive evidence about the effect of nonbanking activity. “Although 
more traditional banking business is associated with less sensitivity to monetary shocks, this 
relationship disappears when …[controlling for] other bank-level variables in the 
regressions”.  
“Nondeposit funding makes banks more susceptible to monetary shocks. Traditional 
bank deposits provide a steady and reliable flow of funds to banks while nondeposit funding 
is more sensitive to shocks in short term interest rates. The fact that some investment banks 
(Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, for example) switched to deposit taking institutions 
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during the 2008 financial crisis provides a case in point”. 
There is “no strong support for the soundness effect with the Z score as a measure of 
bank soundness. However, […] when the capital ratio increases to a certain level, the marginal 
effect of holding more capital diminishes. This sheds light on the capital adequacy 
requirement by bank regulators. It is necessary to maintain a certain level of capital to absorb 
monetary shocks and other risks, but too much capital may prove to be an unnecessary cost to 
banks”. 
2.4: UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY AND BANK STOCKS 
Few papers treat the specific argument of the impact of unconventional monetary policy 
on bank stocks. Ashraf et al. (2017) use an event study and a VAR to test if the QE regime 
changed the impact of the conventional monetary policy on stocks returns of financial 
institutions. Fiordelisi and Ricci (2016) compares the results for the global systemically 
important banks with those for non financial corporations. Kobayashi et al. (2006) analyze the 
impact of QE in Japan, adding dummy variables for event days to the CAPM model. In the 
continuation of this section we will see more in detail the article by Ashraf et al. (2017), and 
more shortly the other two papers. 
2.4.1: Ashraf et al. (2017) 
The paper of Ashraf et al. (2017) examines “the impact of monetary shocks and policy 
tools on aggregate stock returns as well as the stock returns of financial institutions, during 
the […] period of quantitative easing (QE) in the US”. The sample consists of daily and 
weekly returns from 18 December 2002 to 30 November 2011 of 855 financial firms. This 
sample is divided into two subsamples: the pre-QE period, from 18 December 2002 to 24 
December 2008, and the QE period, from 31 December 2008 to 30 November 2011.  
“Summary statistics of conventional and unconventional monetary policy tools and 
monetary shocks support the argument that there is a regime shift in both monetary policy and 
aggregate stock return variables across the pre-QE and QE regimes”.  
With the methodology of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), monetary shocks are split into 
expected (EXP) and unexpected (UNEXP) components. It is also considered the change in the 
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Fed’s total asset holdings in special purchase programs (ΔTOT). In a panel regression, the 
bank stock returns are regressed on these three variables, the dummy QE equal to one during 
the QE period, and the three variables multiplied by the dummy QE. 
Regressions are run for seven financial sector sub-industries: Security and commodity 
brokers; depository institutions; holding companies; other investment offices, insurance 
carriers, insurance agents, brokers and financial services, non-depository credit institutions 
and real estate firms. 
Finally, two VAR models are estimated. The first VAR shows “the effect of expected 
and unexpected monetary shocks, EXP and UNEXP, on aggregate stock returns, measured by 
the returns on the Dow Jones (DJIA) and S&P 500 (SNP500) stock market indexes. It also 
reports the impact on aggregate market volatility, measured by VIX. …[The second VAR 
measures] the impact of monetary policy tools, like the Fed Funds rate (DFF), money supply 
(M1 and Non-M1) and Fed special asset holdings (TOT) on the market indexes. For each 
VAR estimation, first and second lags of the independent variables, as well as lags of the 
dependent variable, are also included in each estimation. …[The models are estimated] for the 
overall sample, the pre-QE sample and the QE sample”. 
Results from the panel regressions show that “monetary shocks and unconventional 
policy tools have an increased marginal impact on the stock returns of financial firms during 
the QE period”. “Moreover, […] unconventional monetary policy tools, measured by […] 
ΔTOT […], are significant factors in explaining the stock returns of financial institutions, 
including those of both depository and non-depository institutions. In addition, the impact of 
special asset programs has a positive and significant marginal impact on the stock returns of 
both depository and non-depository financial firms during the QE period, consistent with the 
motivations of QE policies of imparting liquidity into the financial system”. 
Results from the VAR models “suggest that, during QE regimes, only changes in the 
Federal Reserve’s total assets held under special programs have an impact on aggregate stock 
market returns. …[The] evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that, as the Federal Funds 
rate approaches the zero-bound threshold, it loses its effectiveness as a monetary policy tool,
…[so] the Federal Funds rate and monetary measures of central bank policy do not 
consistently explain stock index returns”. 
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2.4.2: Other papers about unconventional monetary policy and bank stocks 
Fiordelisi and Ricci (2016) evaluate the impact on G-SIBs (Global Systemically 
Important Banks) of the various types of policy interventions during the financial crisis, 
focusing on stock returns and credit default swap (CDS), analyzing also non financial 
companies (NFCs) as a robustness check. The model consists of an event study. The 
dependent variable of the model is the cumulated abnormal return, that is the sum of abnormal 
returns (actual return minus the return predicted by the market model) around the 
announcement date. The explanatory variables are dummy variables indicating an 
announcement in a specific category of policy intervention. Results show that different policy 
interventions caused different reactions by the market. For G-SIBs, monetary policy 
interventions, both expansionary and restrictive, have a positive market impact, but for NFCs 
both expansionary and restrictive measures have a negative impact. Both G-SIBs and NFCs 
negatively react to the end of support measures, bank failures and bailouts. Moreover, G-SIBs 
are more sensitive to policy interventions on their own currency area, and some types of 
interventions have different impact depending on the geographic area. 
Kobayashi et al. (2006) conduct an event study to analyze the impact of QE in Japan on 
bank equity values. The basic model consists of an extension of the CAPM, where the 
dependent variable is the return of the TOPIX bank index and the explanatory variable is the 
return of the overall TOPIX index, and dummy variables for each event day are included. 
Results show that “excess returns of Japanese banks were greater when increases in the BOJ 
current account balance target were accompanied by non-standard expansionary policies. …
[In addition, a bigger positive impact is found for] financially weaker Japanese banks”. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
3.1: BASELINE MODEL AND TYPES OF ANALYSIS 
3.1.1: Baseline model 
We employ a method based on Haitsma et al. (2016). The basic model is the following: 
   Rt = α + βu*Unexpt + βe*Expt + βs*Spreadt + βx*Xt + εt 
This is an event study, that is a regression done only for specific days. As event days, 
Haitsma et al. (2016) take the days of governing council meetings as conventional monetary 
policy days, and as unconventional monetary policy days they take the dates used in Rogers et 
al. (2014), but since those dates arrive until April 2014, they add days when there are news 
about unconventional monetary policy from the ECB press release, up to February 2015. We 
use the same procedure, taking in the period 01/01/2000 - 30/09/2018 the days of governing 
council meetings as conventional monetary policy days, and as days of unconventional 
monetary policy we employ those used by Haitsma et al. (2016), and after February 2015 we 
add days of press releases with news of unconventional monetary policy. The days of 
governing council meetings and press releases are taken from the ECB website. 
The three explanatory variables of interest are Unexp, Exp, and Spread. X is a vector of 
control variables, and ε is the error term. Unexp and Exp are the unexpected and the expected 
components of the one-day change in the policy rate, respectively. The variable Spread is the 
one-day change in the spread, that is the one-day change in the difference between the 10-year 
government bond yield in Italy and in Germany. Note that Spread with the initial capital letter 
refers to the variable, spread refers to the effective sovereign spread. The policy rate is the 
main refinancing rate.  
The main focus is on βs, the coefficient of Spread, which is an estimate of the change in 
basis points of the portfolio returns in response to a change of one basis point on the 
sovereign spread, representing an unconventional monetary policy surprise. 
Spread is set equal to 0 before 22/08/2007, the first day of unconventional monetary 
policy, given that unconventional monetary policy is not present before. Using a dummy 
variable equal to 1 after that day and interacting it with Spread, we find that Spread is strongly 
significant in the period following that day, instead it is not significant before.  
Remember that, according to this model, a variation in the spread in an event day does 
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not reflect an unconventional monetary policy decision, but a difference between this decision 
and what was expected.  
The variables are computed as in Haitsma et al. (2016). The computation of Spread has 
just been explained. Unexp is the one-day change in the implied future rate of the Eurex 
continuous 3 month EURIBOR future, where the future rate is 100 minus the future price. 
Exp is the difference between the actual change in the policy rate and Unexp. The dependent 
variable R is the return of an index or of a portfolio of bank stocks. The vector X of control 
variables includes the same variables of Haitsma et al. (2016), that is the one-day return on 
the MSCI World ex Europe and every dummy variable used in the model. For more details 
about the methodology of Haitsma et al. (2016), see subsection 2.2.3 of this thesis. 
Given that in general the models show heteroskedasticity, all regressions are estimated 
with the robust option for the standard error. 
This model is applied to two different analysis. Firstly, we analyze the impact on the 
aggregate banking sector of the Eurozone. Secondly, we analyze how the bank characteristics 
affect the stocks’ sensitivity to monetary policy. 
3.1.2: Aggregate banking sector 
For the analysis on the aggregate banking sector, we examine three areas: Eurozone, 
World, and Europe excluding Eurozone (Europe intends European countries, therefore not 
only countries of the European Union), looking at both banking sector indexes and whole 
market indexes. In this way, we can estimate the impact of unconventional monetary policy 
surprises on Eurozone banks stock returns, and compare it with the impact outside the 
Eurozone and to the impact on the whole market. 
In addition, we estimate the impact on single country indexes as a robustness check. For 
Eurozone we have indexes of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain; for Europe non Eurozone, we have UK, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Switzerland, Norway; for the rest of the world, we have USA, 
China, Japan, Brazil, India, Mexico, Canada. All indexes used in this analysis are FTSE 
indexes, and they are taken from Thomson Reuters Datastream for Excel. 
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3.1.3: Bank characteristics 
For the analysis of the role of characteristics, we take banks’ historical prices from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream for Excel. Through the filters available, we select banks for 
which stock prices are available in the period 01/01/2000 to 30/09/2018, from the 11 countries 
which are on the Eurozone since 1999, that is Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. The Table 3.1 shows the 47 banks 
of the sample, with the exchange where they are listed and the country where they are located. 
After downloading historical adjusted closing prices, we compute the log returns, equal to the 
natural logarithm of the ratio between the adjusted closing price of that day and the adjusted 
closing price of the day before, that is LN (pricet / pricet-1). 
Name Exchange Country
1 AIB Group Dublin Ireland
2 Alandsbanken A Helsinki Finland
3 Banca Carige Milan Italy
4 Banca Finnat Euramerica Milan Italy
5 Banca Monte dei Paschi Milan Italy
6 Banca Popolare di Sondrio Milan Italy
7 Banca Profilo Milan Italy
8 Banco BPI Euronext.liﬀe Lisbon Portugal
9 Banco BPM Milan Italy
10 Banco Comercial Portugues 'R' Euronext.liﬀe Lisbon Portugal
11 Banco di Sardegna RSP Milan Italy
12 Banco Santander Mercado Continuo Espanol Spain
13 Bank FUR Tirol und Vorarlberg Vienna Stock Exchange Austria
14 Bank of Ireland Group Dublin Ireland
15 Banco Intercontinental Espanol 'R' Mercado Continuo Espanol Spain
16 Banque Nationale de Belgique Euronext.liﬀe Brussels Belgium
17 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Mercado Continuo Espanol Spain
18 Banca Piccolo Credito Valtell Milan Italy
19 Banks Bank Vienna Stock Exchange Austria
20 Banco di Desio E Della Brianza Milan Italy
21 Banque Nationale de Paris Paribas Euronext.liﬀe Paris France
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Table 3.1: Banks on the baseline dataset (Data source: Thomson Reuters Datastream for Excel)

We obtain some characteristics of the banks. Based on Yin and Yang (2013) we take 
number of employees and total assets to measure the bank size, the net interest income 
divided by total operating income and total loans divided by total assets to measure the 
business activity mix (the portion of banking activity compared to the total activity of the 
bank), total deposits divided by total liabilities to measure the funding sources, the capital to 
asset ratio, that is total capital divided by total assets, to measure the bank soundness.  
22 Bper Banca Milan Italy
23 Commerzbank Deutsche Boerse AG Germany
24 Credit Agricole Morbihan Euronext.liﬀe Paris France
25 Crcam Ille-Village CCI Euronext.liﬀe Paris France
26 Crcam Nord CCI Euronext.liﬀe Paris France
27 Credit Agricole Ile de France Euronext.liﬀe Paris France
28 Credit Agricole Toulouse Euronext.liﬀe Paris France
29 Credit Agricole Touraine Euronext.liﬀe Paris France
30 Credit Foncier de Monaco Euronext.liﬀe Paris France
31 Credito Emiliano Milan Italy
32 Deutsche Bank Deutsche Boerse AG Germany
33 Dexia Euronext.liﬀe Brussels Belgium
34 Enercity Par Deutsche Boerse AG Germany
35 Erste Group Bank Vienna Stock Exchange Austria
36 ING Groep Euronext.liﬀe Amsterdam Netherlands
37 Intesa Sanpaolo Milan Italy
38 KBC Group Euronext.liﬀe Brussels Belgium
39 Mediobanca Banca di Credito Financial Milan Italy
40 Merkur Bank Deutsche Boerse AG Germany
41 Natixis Euronext.liﬀe Paris France
42 Oberbank Vienna Stock Exchange Austria
43 Permanent TSB Group Holdings Dublin Ireland
44 Societe Generale Euronext.liﬀe Paris France
45 Unicredit Milan Italy
46 Van Lanschot Kempen Euronext.liﬀe Amsterdam Netherlands
47 Volksbank Vorarlberg Participation Vienna Stock Exchange Austria
Name Exchange Country
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Based on Haitsma et al. (2016), we take the debt to equity ratio, that is total debt 
divided by equity, as a measure of funding sources, the market to book ratio and the price to 
earnings ratio as market data, and market capitalization as a measure of bank size. In reality, 
Haitsma et al. (2016) do not take the market capitalization of the firms in the sample, but they 
take the EURO STOXX Large, Mid and Small. 
In addition, we take interest on government securities to measure the investment on 
government bonds, which are the object of the PSPP of the QE program. From Thomson 
Reuters Datastream, we get the average over the period 01/01/2000 - 30/09/2018 of each of 
those characteristics. Since some data could be not available on the same dates, we take for 
example the average of total capital and the average of total assets, and then divide the two 
averages, instead of computing the capital to asset ratio for each day and then doing the 
average. The Table 3.2 summarizes the characteristics considered. 
Table 3.2: Bank characteristics and the articles to which are based

We estimate the model for two overall portfolios, that is portfolios with all the banks of 
the sample, one equally weighted and another weighted by market capitalization. To see the 
impact of the characteristics we construct three portfolios, High, Medium and Low, for each 
characteristic. We compute the percentile 1/3 and 2/3 of each characteristic, the portfolios 
consist of banks with a value of the characteristic lower or equal than the percentile 1/3 for the 
portfolio Low, higher than the percentile 1/3 and lower than the percentile 2/3 for the portfolio 
characteristic category based on
employees (Emp) bank size Yin and Yang (2013)
total assets (Asset) bank size Yin and Yang (2013)
market capitalization (Cap) bank size Haitsma et al. (2016)
net interest income / operating 
income (Nii)
activity mix Yin and Yang (2013)
loans / assets (Loan) activity mix Yin and Yang (2013)
capital / assets (Cta) bank soundness Yin and Yang (2013)
deposits / liabilities (Dep) funding sources Yin and Yang (2013)
debt to equity (Dte) funding sources Haitsma et al. (2016)
market to book ratio (Mtb) market data Haitsma et al. (2016)
price to earnings ratio (Pe) market data Haitsma et al. (2016)
interest on government 
securities (Gov)
government bonds on bank’s 
portfolio
-
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Medium, higher or equal than the percentile 2/3 for the portfolio High. We compute the 
average return of each portfolio. This method of dividing the sample into portfolios to 
examine the role of characteristics is done also by Haitsma et al. (2016), Madura and 
Schnusenberg (2000), and Yin and Yang (2013), with the first and the second paper dividing 
the sample into three portfolios, and the third paper into ten portfolios. 
The procedure to construct the portfolio returns in Excel is the following. First of all, 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream, we take the adjusted closing stock price from 01/01/2000 
to 30/09/2018 of the banks identified above, and we compute the log returns. In addition, we 
take the average value of the characteristics over the same period. 
To compute the portfolio returns, we use the functions MEDIA.PIU.SE (AVERAGEIFS 
in English) and PERCENTILE (PERCENTILE also in English). With the function 
PERCENTILE we can obtain the percentiles 1/3 and 2/3 of the characteristic, and with the 
function MEDIA.PIU.SE we can compute for each day the average return of those banks 
which respect some criteria, that is a value of the characteristic on the desired range (lower or 
equal than the percentile 1/3, higher than the percentile 1/3 and lower than the percentile 2/3, 
higher or equal than the percentile 2/3). To select the days for the event study, we use the 
function SOMMA.SE (SUMIF in English) which allows to take the values corresponding to 
specific days, that is the event days. 
All the data employed in both types of analysis are obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream for Excel, except the BTP/BUND 10 year spread that comes from Bloomberg, and 
the main refinancing rate from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. The date of the change in 
the main refinancing rate is not the day of the actual change, but the day of the announcement. 
As already said, days of monetary policy are taken from the ECB website and from Haitsma 
et al. (2016). Results and plots are obtained with the statistical software Stata. 
3.2: DIFFERENT SPECIFICATIONS OF THE MODEL AND OF THE DATASET 
We consider alternative specifications of the model and of the dataset, for both types of 
analysis. We use dummy variables to check the impact of some events and of some 
characteristic of the explanatory variables, and we consider variations of the baseline dataset, 
where we use another Euribor future, we use a different time window, we exclude outliers, 
and finally we increase the number of banks reducing the time period. 
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3.2.1: Alternative model specifications 
The various model specifications consist of using dummy variables and interacting them 
with the three explanatory variables. The Table 3.3 describes these dummy variables. 
Table 3.3: Dummy variables

We estimate one model for each type of dummy variable. The explanatory variables of 
each of these models are the three variables of the basic model multiplied by the dummy and 
the three variables multiplied by one minus the dummy, with MSCI World ex Europe return 
and the dummy variable/variables as control variables. The models include a constant. 
Therefore, the explanatory variables of the models are: Unexp*D, Unexp*(1-D), Exp*D, 
Exp*(1-D), Spread*D, Spread*(1-D), MSCI World ex Europe return, D, where D is the 
dummy variable. Note that for sign and change direction the dummy is different for each 
variable. 
The first model is the basic model, with the variables for conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy considered for the entire sample period. The second model 
adds the dummy UN, equal to 1 starting from the 22/08/2007, the day of the first 
unconventional monetary policy measure, and this dummy is interacted with the unexpected 
and expected rate change, whereas the spread is already multiplied by this dummy, since it is 
imposed equal to zero before that day, given that unconventional measures were not present 
before. In this way, the sample is divided into two periods, before and after the start of 
unconventional measures, where before only the expected and unexpected rate change are the 
explanatory variables, and after there is also the spread, which represents the unconventional 
monetary policy shock. This dummy variable is the same used by Haitsma et al. (2016), with 
only a different name. 
The third model adds the dummy QE to the previously described model, equal to 1 
event/characteristic dummy name equal to 1 when
crisis UN from 22/08/2007 to the end
QE start QE from 22/01/2015 to the end
sign Pu, Pe, Ps Unexp, Exp and Spread are positive
change direction Cu, Ce, Cs Unexp, Exp and Spread have a sign diﬀerent from the previous value
contemporaneous Cont The event day is both a conventional and an unconventional monetary policy day
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starting from the 22/01/2015, the day of the announcement of the start of the QE. Therefore 
this model divides the sample into three periods, before the crisis (2000-2007), after the crisis 
and before the QE (2007-2015) and after the start of QE (2015-2018). This dummy variable is 
used also by Ashraf et al. (2017), even if in a different model. 
The fourth model divides each of the three variables into positive and negative values. 
The dummy variables Pu, Pe, Ps are equal to 1 when Unexp, Exp and Spread respectively are 
positive. In this way we can see if expansionary and restrictive policies have a different 
impact. This type of dummy variable is used also by Nakazono and Ikeda (2016), even if in a 
different model. 
The fifth model defines the dummy variables Cu, Ce, Cs, equal to 1 when there is a 
change in the sign of Unexp, Exp and Spread respectively. In this way, the variables are 
divided based on whether there is a change in the sign of the variable or not, and so whether 
there is a change in the direction of the policy, from expansionary to contractionary or vice 
versa. The inspiration for this dummy variable comes from Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), 
which investigate the role of a change in the direction of policy, even if with a different 
model. 
The sixth model considers a dummy, Cont, equal to 1 in those days which are both 
conventional and unconventional event days. This model allows watching whether a 
contemporaneous announcement of conventional and unconventional monetary policy has a 
different effect (note that contemporaneous means on the same day). Note that, differently 
from the dummy for positive values and for sign changes, this dummy is equal for each 
variable, since it is not referred to a variable, but to event days, as the dummy UN and QE. 
The inspiration for this dummy variable comes from Madura and Schnusenberg (2000), which 
use a dummy variable to see if a contemporaneous discount rate and federal funds target rate 
change has a different impact. 
The models with the sign dummy and the change direction dummy are computed also 
adding the dummy UN and QE, to see if the sign and the sign change matters differently in 
the three periods. We examine also how results change when we consider the actual change of 
the conventional policy tool not divided into the expected and unexpected component. 
Each of the models with dummy variables is also computed in the alternative 
specification where we consider the three variables and the three variables multiplied by the 
dummy, that is: Unexp, Unexp*D, Exp, Exp*D, Spread, Spread*D, and control variables. In 
this way, we can see if the difference between the coefficients is significant or not. 
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3.2.2: Alternative dataset specifications 
Table 3.4: Description of alternative datasets

The Table 3.4 describes the alternative datasets considered. Firstly, the dataset Twoday 
considers a different window for the evaluation of events. The returns are computed as the 
natural logarithm of the ratio between the adjusted closing price on the day after the 
announcement and that on the day before, instead of the day of the announcement and the day 
before. Also Unexp, Exp, Spread and MSCI World ex Europe return are computed with this 
two day window. In this way, we capture also market reactions that happen the day after, 
given that the reaction could be delayed. However, this method increases the influence of 
omitted variables. 
Secondly, the dataset Outliers removes from the sample some event days which are 
considered outliers. We compute the residuals of the model with the two time dummy, UN 
and QE (the third model described in the previous subsection), with the capitalization 
weighted portfolio as the dependent variable, and we remove from the sample the event days 
with an absolute value of the residual higher than a certain threshold. The threshold chosen is 
2,5, resulting in 19 event days eliminated. Also Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) consider the 
elimination of outliers, even if computed differently.  
Thirdly, the dataset Future considers another continuous Euribor future. On Datastream, 
there are two continuous Euribor future, one from Eurex, used in the baseline dataset, and one 
from Liffe. We will see if and how results change with this different future. Comparing the 
time series of the two futures, the mean and variance are very similar. However, taking the 
first difference, the future by Eurex has a higher volatility and a slightly higher mean. Bredin 
et al. (2009) use the Euribor future by Eurex. 
Fourthly, given that the large sample size (2000-2018) has the drawback to limit the 
Dataset Description
Baseline 47 banks, 2000-2018, Eurex future, one day return, all 248 event days
Twoday 47 banks, 2000-2018, Eurex future, two day return, all 248 event days
Outliers 47 banks, 2000-2018, Eurex future, one day return, 229 event days (19 outliers excluded)
Future 47 banks, 2000-2018, Liﬀe future, one day return, all 248 event days
Ext2007 70 banks, 2007-2018, Eurex future, one day return, all 248 event days
Twodayfut 47 banks, 2000-2018, Liﬀe future, two day return, all 248 event days
Ext2007fut 70 banks, 2007-2018, Liﬀe future, one day return, all 248 event days
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number of banks in the dataset, the dataset Ext2007 restricts the sample size to the period of 
unconventional monetary policies, starting from 22/08/2007. In this way we have a dataset of 
70 banks from the countries which constituted the Eurozone on 2007, that is the 11 countries 
on the Eurozone since its birth considered in the baseline dataset, plus Greece, which joined in 
2001, and Slovenia, which joined in 2007. This allows having more banks in the dataset, even 
if we do not control for the conventional monetary policy in the pre-crisis period. Finally, the 
two datasets Twodayfut and Ext2007fut are the datasets Twoday and Ext2007 with the Liffe 
future instead of the Eurex future. 
These alternative datasets are considered in both types of analysis, except the extended 
datasets (Ext2007 and Ext2007fut) which can be applied only to the analysis of bank 
characteristics. 
To have all the variables with the same unit of measure, stock returns and MSCI World 
ex Europe returns are multiplied by 100, and the spread, which is originally expressed in basis 
points, is divided by 100. In this way, all variables are in percentage points. 
Remark: when we say that a coefficient is significant without indicating the significance 
level, we mean significant at 10% level. When the significance is expressed by the stars, we 
have *=significant at 10% level, **=significant at 5% level, ***=significant at 1% level. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The tables below show some descriptive statistics. The Table 4.1 shows the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and number of non-zero values, of the returns of the 
capitalization weighted portfolio (AllW), the explanatory variables Unexp, Exp, Spread and 
the control MSCIret (return of the MSCI World ex Europe). The Table 4.2 is the correlation 
matrix of these variables, and the Table 4.3 is the correlation matrix for the post-crisis sample. 
The Table 4.4 shows the number of event days, total, pre- and post-crisis, pre- and post-QE, of 
conventional and unconventional monetary policy, with the first and last day. Remember that 
the variables are defined only on event days. 
Table 4.1: Mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and non zero values

The Table 4.1 shows that the volatility of the bank portfolio is much higher than that of 
the explanatory variables. In particular, Unexp, Exp and Spread have a very low volatility 
compared to that of AllW and MSCIret. In addition, the means of the explanatory variables 
are zero or close to zero, instead the portfolio has a positive mean, equal to 0,13. The higher 
volatility of AllW is reflected into higher absolute values of the minimum and the maximum. 
The last column shows that, for some of the 248 days, the value of Unexp and Exp is zero. 
The number of non-zero values for Spread is 132, that is exactly the number of post-crisis 
days, and this means that there is always a change in the spread in the post-crisis period event 
days (remember that, in the pre-crisis period, Spread is set to 0). 
mean std min max non zero
AllW 0,13 2,40 -10,28 17,18 248
Unexp 0,00 0,05 -0,27 0,29 209
Exp -0,01 0,14 -0,81 0,33 212
Spread -0,00 0,09 -0,46 0,56 132
MSCIret 0,01 1,22 -4,88 3,49 248
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Table 4.2: Correlation table of the full sample

Table 4.3: Correlation table post-crisis

The Table 4.2 shows that the strongest correlations are AllW with MSCIret (0,51) and 
AllW with Spread (-0,58). The fact that there are no strong correlations between explanatory 
variables (the highest correlation in absolute value is -0,24 between Exp and Unexp) is good 
for the model specification. The relatively high correlations of AllW with MSCIret and Spread 
is reflected, as we will see in the results of the model, in significant coefficients only for these 
two variables, in general. 
Restricting the sample to only the post-crisis period (Table 4.3), almost all correlations 
increase in absolute value, suggesting a greater dependence of bank stock returns to monetary 
policy in the crisis period. 
Table 4.4: Event days

Corr FS AllW Unexp Exp Spread MSCIret
AllW 1 -0,04 0,17 -0,58 0,51
Unexp -0,04 1 -0,24 0,08 0,12
Exp 0,17 -0,24 1 -0,08 0,23
Spread -0,58 0,08 -0,08 1 -0,15
MSCIret 0,51 0,12 0,23 -0,15 1
Corr PC AllW Unexp Exp Spr MSCIret
AllW 1 -0,11 0,28 -0,63 0,55
Unexp -0,11 1 -0,41 0,11 -0,07
Exp 0,28 -0,41 1 -0,11 0,31
Spr -0,63 0,11 -0,11 1 -0,20
MSCIret 0,55 -0,07 0,31 -0,20 1
event days first day last day
Total 248 05/01/2000 13/09/2018
pre-crisis 116 05/01/2000 02/08/2007
post-crisis 132 22/08/2007 13/09/2018
post-crisis pre-QE 97 22/08/2007 04/12/2014
post-QE 35 22/01/2015 13/09/2018
conventional 235 05/01/2000 13/09/2018
unconventional 34 22/08/2007 14/06/2018
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The Table 4.4 shows that the dummy for the crisis splits the sample period in two 
almost equal parts, 116 and 132 days. Instead, the dummy QE split the post-crisis period in 
two different parts, but the problem is that we have only 35 days in the post-QE periods, a 
small sample size which could make the estimates for this period not very reliable. 
Among the 248 total event days, 235 are conventional monetary policy days, that is 
governing council meeting days. The unconventional monetary policy days are 34, of which 
13 (that is 248-235) are exclusively unconventional days, and the remaining 21 are also 
conventional monetary policy days. In the conventional monetary policy days which are not 
also unconventional days, obviously only in the post-crisis period, there could be an impact of 
the unconventional monetary policy surprise, even if it is not an unconventional day. This is 
possible because of the definition of unconventional monetary policy surprise, that is a 
difference between the actions and what was expected. If the market expected an action of 
unconventional monetary policy, but this action didn’t happen, this generates a surprise and so 
a reaction by the market, even if no unconventional action was taken. This is explained by 
Nakazono and Ikeda (2016), as already seen in the second chapter of this thesis. 
Remember that, differently from pre- and post-crisis and pre- and post-QE days, the 
days of conventional and unconventional monetary policy are not a continuous portion of 
total days. This means that the days are not all the days that go from the first and last day 
indicated in the Table 4.4. 
4.2: RESULTS FROM BANK AND MARKET INDEXES 
This section reports the results for the analysis of the aggregate banking index. The 
focus is on the banking sector indexes and whole market indexes for Eurozone, Europe 
excluding Eurozone and World. 
In the tables of this section, if coefficients are in bold it means that they are significant 
at the 10% level. When we say that Spread is significant, we mean that the coefficient of 
Spread is significant. Normally, almost always, coefficients of Spread are negative, so when 
we say that the impact increases in reality the coefficient decreases, since we refer to the 
absolute value. 
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4.2.1: Baseline specification 
Table 4.5: Results from the baseline specification

The Table 4.5 shows that Spread is significant for all three areas, for both bank and 
market indexes. However, there is a clearly stronger impact on Eurozone rather than on the 
rest of Europe and the entire World. The Table 4.5 reports also the difference between 
coefficients for banking sector and the whole market. This difference shows an additional 
impact on banking sector with respect to the whole market. This additional impact is much 
higher for Eurozone compared to Europe ex Eurozone and World. The differences between 
bank and market indexes are not tested, so they are not in bold, but it does not mean that the 
differences are not significant. 
Among bank and market indexes of single countries, almost all have a significantly 
negative coefficient. The impact on Eurozone countries is heterogeneous, with the coefficient 
of the bank index ranging between a maximum of -18.07 for Italy and a minimum of -7.88 for 
Greece. The coefficients in other countries have a lower magnitude, with European countries 
having a higher coefficient than countries of other continents. In fact, European non-Eurozone 
countries coefficients range between -7.22 for Switzerland and -4.16 for Poland. Non-
European countries have coefficients ranging between -5.16 of USA and -1.72 of Canada. 
We compute the difference between coefficients for the banking sector and the whole 
market for single country indexes (only if both coefficients are significant). This difference 
for Eurozone countries ranges between 2.91 for Greece and 8.93 for Belgium. For European 
non-Eurozone countries, it ranges between 0.84 for Poland and 4.31 for Switzerland. 
Therefore, for all European countries this difference is positive, both inside and outside the 
Eurozone. For some non-European countries it is slightly negative, and it ranges between 
-0.31 of China and 1.96 of USA. This means that in Eurozone the banking sector is more 
affected than the whole market, and this additional impact is found also in European non-
Eurozone countries, even if of a lower magnitude. For non-European countries the difference 
is relatively small. 
bank index market index diﬀerence
Eurozone -13,93 -6,61 7,32
Europe ex Eurozone -6,57 -3,75 2,82
World -4,78 -3,24 1,54
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4.2.2: Pre- and post-QE 
Table 4.6: Results in the pre- and post-QE periods

The Table 4.6 shows that, for all three bank indexes, the coefficient is significant only in 
the pre-QE period, instead for the market indexes it is significant also in the post-QE period 
only for Eurozone. In addition, the impact is higher in the pre-QE period than in the post-QE, 
for both bank and market indexes. The World and Europe ex Eurozone indexes have a lower 
difference between coefficients than the Eurozone indexes. 
However, the difference between coefficients is not significant for all bank and market 
indexes, so the impact is not significantly different in the two periods. This may be due to the 
small sample size in the post-QE period (2015-2018), where we have only 35 event days, 
compared to the 97 event days in the pre-QE period (2007-2015). 
Results are confirmed by indexes of single countries, given that only few countries have 
a significant coefficient in the post-QE period and almost all have a significant coefficient in 
the pre-QE period. Moreover, the difference between coefficients is significant only for few 
countries, and this holds for both bank and market indexes. For the few indexes with a 
significant difference between coefficients, this difference suggests that the impact is stronger 
in the pre-QE period. 
In summary, we find that in the post-QE period the impact of unconventional monetary 
policy surprises seems no more significant, but the change in the impact is not significant, 
suggesting that the small sample size does not allow to establish a clear result. 
4.2.3: Positive and negative changes 
We consider the model with the dummy for positive and negative values of variables, so 
the change in the spread is divided into increases and decreases, that is contractionary and 
expansionary unconventional monetary policy surprises. In total, we have 62 increases and 70 
bank index market index
pre-QE post-QE diﬀerence pre-QE post-QE diﬀerence
Eurozone -14,05 -5,58 8,47 -6,65 -4,24 2,41
Europe ex 
Eurozone
-6,74 -5,65 1,09 -3,80 -3,21 0,59
World -4,85 -3,98 0,87 -3,33 -2,42 0,91
 63
decreases of the spread, so the expansionary measures are more than the contractionary ones. 
Table 4.7: Results for increases and decreases of the spread

The Table 4.7 shows that for all three areas the impact is significantly negative for both 
increases and decreases of the spread. However, the impact of decreases is higher than that of 
increases. Therefore, there is an inverse relation between spread changes and index returns for 
both decreases and increases, but decreases have a stronger impact. The difference between 
coefficients is significant, except only for the Europe ex Eurozone bank index. 
Moreover, the impact on Eurozone is always higher than on the other areas, for both 
increases and decreases of the spread and for both bank and market indexes, and the impact 
on bank index is always stronger than on market index. These results are in line with the 
previous findings in the baseline model. 
About single countries, in Eurozone we find significant coefficients for both increases 
and decreases for almost all countries, instead in other countries we find more significant 
coefficients for decreases than for increases. The difference between coefficients is significant 
for almost all Eurozone countries, instead it is significant for few other countries. When this 
difference is significant, it is always in favor of decreases. 
In summary, we find evidence that both expansionary and contractionary 
unconventional monetary policy surprises have a significant impact on index returns, but there 
is a stronger impact of expansionary unconventional monetary policy surprises than of 
contractionary ones, mainly in Eurozone but also outside. Results are supported by 
regressions of single country indexes. 
4.2.4: Change direction 
Now we consider the model with the dummy for a change in the sign of the variable. 
This means that a day with a type of action (contractionary or expansionary) different from 
bank index market index
Positive Negative diﬀerence Positive Negative diﬀerence
Eurozone -9,27 -17,99 8,72 -3,74 -8,15 4,41
Europe ex 
Eurozone
-3,46 -6,96 3,50 -1,43 -4,37 2,94
World -2,72 -5,93 3,21 -2,18 -3,92 1,74
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that of the previous event day is considered separately from a day with a type of action equal 
to the previous event day. We have 68 values of Spread with a change in the direction and 64 
with no change in the direction. 
Table 4.8: Results for no change and change of direction

The Table 4.8 shows that there is a significantly negative impact in both cases, for all 
three areas and for both bank and market indexes. The difference between coefficients is 
positive for Eurozone bank and market indexes, instead it is negative for the other two areas. 
However, this difference is significant only for the World market index. This suggests that 
there is not a different impact in the two cases. A change in the direction of policy seems to 
give an additional impact on Eurozone bank and market indexes, but this additional impact is 
not significant. 
As already said, the World market index shows a significantly negative difference 
between coefficients, which means that there is a lower impact on this index when there is a 
direction change. Results are supported by single country indexes, where we find a significant 
difference between coefficients only for Canada bank index and for USA market index. 
In summary, there is no evidence of a different impact of unconventional monetary 
policy surprises when there is a change in the direction, at least in Eurozone, given that we 
find a significant impact for the World market index, probably driven by the highly significant 
impact on USA market index. 
4.2.5: Types of monetary policy 
We consider the specification with the dummy equal to 1 during days of both 
conventional and unconventional monetary policy, to see if a contemporaneous announcement 
has a different impact. Among the event days, there are 21 days that are both conventional and 
bank index market index
no change 
direction
change 
direction
diﬀerence no change 
direction
change 
direction
diﬀerence
Eurozone -12,48 -14,74 2,26 -6,32 -6,91 0,59
Europe ex 
Eurozone
-8,77 -6,25 -2,52 -4,50 -3,73 -0,77
World -6,70 -4,46 -2,24 -4,73 -2,92 -1,81
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unconventional monetary policy days. The low number of contemporaneous policy days 
could make the estimates not very reliable. 
Table 4.9: Results for the three types of monetary policy

The subtable A of the Table 4.9 shows that in both cases the impact is significantly 
negative. Moreover, for Eurozone the difference is significant and positive, suggesting that a 
contemporaneous conventional monetary policy day makes the unconventional monetary 
policy less effective. The difference is positive also for Europe ex Eurozone and World 
indexes, but for Europe ex Eurozone it is not significant for both bank and market indexes. 
Among single country indexes, the difference is significant and positive for some, but 
not all, Eurozone countries, and for few other countries, for both bank and market indexes. 
These results support our findings.  
In summary, when the two types of policy happen in the same day, the unconventional 
monetary policy surprises have a lower impact on Eurozone bank and market indexes. The 
same holds for World indexes, but not for the rest of Europe. 
Given this result, we consider three types of event days for the unconventional 
monetary policy surprise. Firstly, conventional / not unconventional event days, that is 
governing council meeting days when there are no announcements of unconventional 
bank index market index
subtable A U and C other days diﬀerence U and C other days diﬀerence
Eurozone -9,89 -16,79 6,90 -4,68 -7,92 3,24
Europe ex 
Eurozone
-4,76 -7,80 3,04 -2,72 -4,50 1,78
World -3,34 -5,84 2,50 -2,45 -3,85 1,40
subtable B C / not U other days diﬀerence C / not U other days diﬀerence
Eurozone -12,32 -14,95 2,63 -5,89 -7,07 1,18
Europe ex 
Eurozone
-6,73 -6,46 -0,27 -3,68 -3,79 0,11
World -5,28 -4,46 -0,82 -3,29 -3,21 -0,08
subtable C U / not C other days diﬀerence U / not C other days diﬀerence
Eurozone -25,56 -10,95 -14,61 -11,77 -5,23 -6,54
Europe ex 
Eurozone
-10,53 -5,61 -4,92 -6,05 -3,08 -2,97
World -7,17 -4,14 -3,03 -4,87 -2,75 -2,12
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monetary policy. Secondly, unconventional / not conventional event days, that is days of 
unconventional monetary policy announcements which are not governing council meeting 
days. Thirdly, unconventional and conventional days, that is governing council meeting with 
an announcement of unconventional monetary policy. The latter type of event day has just 
been examined, we want to examine the other two types of events in the same way. 
The subtable B of the Table 4.9 shows the results for the first type of event days 
(conventional / not unconventional). The impact is not significantly different from all other 
days, for both bank and market indexes and for all three areas. The same result is found for all 
the regressions for single country indexes, strongly supporting the findings. 
The subtable C of the Table 4.9 shows the results for the second type of event days 
(unconventional / not conventional). Only for Eurozone, the impact is significantly different 
from all other days. Moreover, the impact is more than double than on the other days, for both 
bank and market indexes. Results are confirmed by single country regressions, where we find 
significant differences between coefficients mainly for Eurozone countries. 
Finally, we run the regression with Spread divided into the three types of event days. 
The coefficient is strongly significant for all three types of event days. This means that, even 
if the impact differs between the three types of event days, it is always significant. 
In summary, the impact of unconventional monetary policy surprises on Eurozone is 
different between the three types of event days. The strongest impact is during event days 
which are not governing council meeting days, then during governing council meeting days 
which are not unconventional monetary policy days, and finally the lower impact is during 
governing council meeting days which are also unconventional monetary policy days. 
4.2.6: Multiple dummy specifications 
We consider the models with two types of dummy used together. The first of these two 
models considers the dummy which divides the period into pre- and post-QE together with the 
dummy for positive and negative changes. In this way we can see if the impact of increases 
and decreases found before is the same in both periods. 
For all three areas, both bank and market indexes have a significant coefficient of 
increases and decreases only in the pre-QE period, in line with the previous finding that in the 
post-QE period the coefficient is not significant. There is one exception, for the World bank 
index there is a significant coefficient for spread decreases also in the post-QE period, 
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probably driven by a significant coefficient on the USA bank index. The coefficients for the 
post-QE period are not significant for all Eurozone countries, supporting results for Eurozone 
indexes. 
The second model uses the dummy variable to divide the sample period into pre- and 
post-QE with that for change in the direction of policy. We find, in line to what seen before, 
that in the pre-QE period Spread is significant, both with and without change of direction. In 
the second period in general it is not significant in both cases, but for Eurozone market index 
it is significant when there is no change in the direction. However, there is no strong support 
to this finding, given that only two Eurozone countries have a significant coefficient. 
In summary, in the post-QE period, Spread is not significant even if we split it into 
increases and decreases or into direction change and no direction change. 
4.2.7: Conventional monetary policy 
The two variables of conventional monetary policy, that is Unexp and Exp, are not 
significant for all our three main bank indexes in the baseline model. Among market indexes, 
we find a significant coefficient for Unexp for the World index. Only few single country 
market indexes have significant coefficients, supporting this result, with a significant 
coefficient on the equation for USA market index which may be the reason for the significant 
coefficient in the World market index. Besides the issue of significance, the Table 4.10 shows 
the coefficients of Unexp and Exp for the main indexes. 
Table 4.10: Results for conventional monetary policy

The Table 4.10 shows that for Eurozone there is a bigger impact of Unexp on banks than 
on the whole market, and a different sign of the impact of Exp between bank and market 
indexes. Moreover, among the coefficients of Unexp for bank indexes, the Eurozone index 
has the highest absolute value, and conversely among market indexes it has the lowest 
bank index market index
Unexp Exp Unexp Exp
Eurozone -1,88 0,17 -0,16 -0,21
Europe ex 
Eurozone
-1,03 -0,25 1,02 -0,30
World 0,68 0,65 2,47 0,38
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absolute value. About the coefficients of Exp, for both bank and market indexes, the Eurozone 
index has the lowest absolute value.  
It is surprising to find a significant coefficient only for the World and not for Eurozone 
or Europe, this means that there is an impact on the world market, but this is driven not by 
Eurozone’s impact but by an impact on USA, a strange result. The alternative models for 
Eurozone bank index show a significant coefficient for Unexp only when there is no change 
in the direction of policy. The results do not change much when considering alternative 
datasets. 
4.2.8: Robustness check: alternative datasets 
We check the robustness of the results watching at alternative dataset specifications. The 
alternative datasets are four: one with the Liffe Euribor future instead of the Eurex, two with 
the two-day window (one with the Eurex and one with the Liffe future), and the dataset with 
the exclusion of outliers. 
The use of the Liffe future does not change the main results. However, for the 
alternative datasets with the two-day window and with the exclusion of outliers, the difference 
between coefficients of positive and negative values of Spread is not significant, contrary to 
the baseline findings. Similarly, with these datasets there is no more a significantly different 
impact of Spread when there is a contemporaneous conventional monetary policy.  
Therefore, with the alternative datasets the impacts of the sign of Spread and of the 
contemporaneous conventional monetary policy disappear. This robustness check does not 
support our previous results, but this doesn’t mean that results were wrong, since the baseline 
dataset specification should be the best specification, given that it is preferable to keep all 
event days, to get a comprehensive result, and to use a one-day window, to avoid the influence 
of omitted variables. 
One thing to underline is that the coefficients of Spread are almost always strongly 
significant, that is with a p-value equal to zero or very close to zero, for all datasets 
specifications. This means that there is for sure an impact of Spread on stock returns, not only 
for banks but also for the market, even if the impact is stronger on banks. Instead, the 
difference between the coefficients of positive and negative values of Spread, and for the 
types of monetary policy, are significant in the baseline specification, but with a p-value 
which is not zero, but lower than 0,1, so significant at 10% level. Therefore, alternative 
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specifications could make the p-value higher than 0,1 if it is only slightly lower than 0,1. 
Now let’s see how coefficients of bank and market indexes in the baseline model change 
in the various datasets. We have coefficients for the five datasets, bank and market indexes, 
for Eurozone, Europe ex Eurozone, World, and the two portfolios equally weighted (All) and 
capitalization weighted (AllW) of the banks used in the next section about the impact of bank 
characteristics (listed in the Table 3.1 of the third chapter). All coefficients are strongly 
significant, in fact all coefficients have a p-value equal to zero, at least when the p-value is 
rounded to the fourth decimal digit. 
Table 4.11: Results from diﬀerent datasets

The Table 4.11 shows that the coefficients of the Eurozone bank index and of the 
capitalization weighted portfolio are similar, in fact they are both based on Eurozone banks. 
The equally weighted portfolio has a lower coefficient in absolute value than the 
capitalization weighted, meaning that highly capitalized banks have a higher sensitivity to 
Spread, as we will see in the next section about the impact of bank characteristics.  
For all datasets and for both bank and market indexes, the Eurozone indexes have 
always a higher coefficient in absolute value than the other indexes. This means that, even if 
there is an impact of ECB unconventional monetary policy also outside the Eurozone, as 
expected the impact on Eurozone is stronger. The impact on Eurozone banks is about three 
times higher than the impact on the entire World bank indexes, and about twice higher for 
market indexes. In addition, the impact on bank indexes is always higher than on market 
indexes, especially on Eurozone. 
Using the Liffe future instead of the Eurex future does not change much the coefficients. 
The exclusion of outliers reduces the impact of about one unity for Eurozone bank index, and 
Baseline Future Outlier Twoday Twodayfut
Bank Market Bank Market Bank Market Bank Market Bank Market
Eurozone -13,93 -6,61 -13,91 -6,64 -12,73 -6,07 -17,10 -7,59 -17,08 -7,55
Europe ex 
Eurozone
-6,57 -3,75 -6,66 -3,80 -5,64 -3,47 -8,02 -3,89 -7,95 -3,88
World -4,78 -3,24 -4,77 -3,25 -4,35 -3,01 -6,36 -3,96 -6,33 -4,01
All -8,47 -8,43 -8,04 -10,80 -10,81
AllW -13,28 -13,24 -12,20 -16,88 -16,83
 70
in general the impact is slightly lower, even if again strongly significant. The two-day window 
in general increases the impact, for Eurozone banks the impact is about two unities higher, 
and a lower increase of the impact can be found on other indexes. However, we are not able to 
say if the reason of this higher impact is a delayed reaction of the market or the influence of 
omitted variables. 
4.3: THE IMPACT OF BANK CHARACTERISTICS 
For each category of characteristics we have four results. Firstly, the table with the 
coefficients of Spread, that is the estimate of the impact of unconventional monetary policy 
surprises, for the three portfolios High, Medium and Low for each characteristic. The 
categories of the characteristics are bank size, activity mix, bank soundness, funding sources, 
market data, and government securities. In addition, the tables show the trend of these 
coefficients, that is if the absolute value of the coefficients is increasing or decreasing with 
respect to the characteristic. Therefore, the trend is increasing (decreasing) if the High 
portfolio has a bigger (lower) sensitivity than the Medium, which in turn has a bigger (lower) 
sensitivity than the Low. If it is neither increasing nor decreasing, it is written max (min) if 
Medium has the maximum (minimum) absolute value. 
All coefficients are negative and strongly significant (p-value never exceed 0,001). 
Given that all coefficients are negative, an increasing trend implies decreasing coefficients 
and vice versa. We check the robustness of results looking if results change in the alternative 
model specifications.  
Secondly, for each characteristic we test if the coefficients of Spread estimated for the 
three portfolios are significantly different from each other. To do this, for each characteristic 
we estimate the three equations of the portfolios High, Medium and Low with the method 
SURE (seemingly unrelated regressions), instead of estimating each equation with OLS 
separately. This allows to test the equality of the coefficients across equations. In the tables 
we have the p-values of the test for the equality of the coefficients, High=Medium, 
High=Low, Medium=Low, and High=Medium=Low for each characteristic, with the stars 
indicating the significance of the difference between coefficients. This type of test is done also 
by Madura and Schnusenberg (2000). 
Regression results and p-values of the tests are obtained for the baseline dataset (47 
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banks, 2000-2018) and for the extended dataset (70 banks, 2007-2018). Both results are 
obtained for the baseline model (without dummy variables). 
Thirdly, we estimate the baseline model for each single bank of the dataset, and take 
their coefficients of Spread, which represent their sensitivity to unconventional monetary 
policy surprises. For each characteristic we display the scatter plot of the sensitivity with 
respect to the value of the characteristic, together with the linear and quadratic prediction 
plots. This gives a graphical idea of how the characteristic influences the sensitivity of a bank. 
Given that plots of the baseline and extended dataset lead to similar conclusions, we display 
the plots of the extended dataset, since it comprises more banks. Remember that a decreasing 
(increasing) trend of the scatter plot means an increasing (decreasing) sensitivity, given that 
coefficients are normally negative (all significant coefficients are negative). 
Fourthly, for each characteristic we regress the bank sensitivity on the value of the 
characteristic, that is we estimate the linear regressions shown in the plots, for both baseline 
and extended datasets, and show the coefficients for both datasets with their significance 
indicated by stars. This method of estimating the sensitivity of single banks and regressing it 
on a characteristic is employed also by Flannery and James (1984), who examine whether the 
interest rate sensitivity of bank stocks depends on maturity composition of their assets. That 
paper is discussed in the second chapter of this thesis. 
If not specified differently, we will discuss the results of the baseline dataset, and then 
say if results from the extended dataset support or contrast the baseline results. When High, 
Medium and Low are written with initial capital letter, we refer to the portfolios constructed 
with banks with a high, medium and low value of the characteristic. When it is written, for 
example, employees portfolios, we mean portfolios constructed according to number of 
employees, and the same for other characteristics. When we refer to the impact or the 
sensitivity, we mean the impact of Spread or the sensitivity to Spread, two ways to say its 
coefficient in absolute value. 
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4.3.1: Bank size 
Table 4.12: Bank size: portfolio coeﬃcients

The bank size is measured by the number of employees, total assets, and market 
capitalization. The Table 4.12 shows that the impact is increasing for all three measures, 
providing evidence that the sensitivity is stronger for biggest banks. The impact increases 
more from Low to Medium than from Medium to High.  
The impact is increasing for both pre- and post-QE periods, for both decreases and 
increases of the spread, for both change and no change direction, and for both 
contemporaneous conventional monetary policy and not, for all three measures. The only 
exception is for spread decreases for portfolios based on market capitalization, where the 
coefficients of High, Medium and Low are -8,08, -9,06 and -1,11 respectively, that is a 
maximum on the Medium portfolio. This is the only exception, so the models with dummy 
variables in general provide results in line with the baseline results. The models estimated 
with the actual change of conventional policy tool, instead of separating the expected and 
unexpected components, support the results. The results from the extended dataset are all in 
line with those from the baseline dataset, with coefficients slightly different, but with the trend 
always increasing. 
Results are confirmed by the coefficients of the overall portfolios, given that the impact 
on the capitalization weighted portfolio (-13,28) is bigger than on the equally weighted 
portfolio (-8,47), as already seen in the previous section (see Table 4.11). In fact, banks with 
high capitalization, which have a higher sensitivity, have a bigger weight on the capitalization 
weighted portfolio, increasing the sensitivity with respect to the equally weighted. 
Baseline (47 banks, 2000-2018) Extended (70 banks, 2007-2018)
High Med Low trend High Med Low trend
Employees -13,85 -9,93 -1,72 increasing -12,52 -7,66 -1,38 increasing
Assets -13,39 -10,76 -1,40 increasing -11,81 -8,16 -2,05 increasing
Capitalization -12,27 -10,94 -2,34 increasing -12,26 -8,30 -1,46 increasing
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Table 4.13: Bank size: SURE test

The Table 4.13 shows that the impact is significantly different between portfolios, since 
p-values are almost all zero or very close to zero, for all three characteristics, with only one 
exception. In the baseline dataset, for capitalization portfolios the impacts on High and 
Medium portfolios are not significantly different, which suggests that, once reached a certain 
level of capitalization, the impact does not vary much when capitalization increases. 
However, with the extended dataset, also these two portfolios have significantly different 
impacts. In general, this test confirms the increasing impact of bank size. 
 
Figure 4.1: Plots for Emp, Asset, and Cap (all and less than €20 million), obtained with Stata

Baseline High=Medium High=Low Medium=Low High=Med=Low Trend
Emp 0,0003 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** increasing
Asset 0,0201 ** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** increasing
Cap 0,2667 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** increasing
Extended High=Medium High=Low Medium=Low High=Med=Low Trend
Emp 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** increasing
Asset 0,0006 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** increasing
Cap 0,0005 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** increasing
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The scatter plots on the Figure 4.1 confirm the findings. The first and second plots show 
a clearly decreasing trend for the plots based on number of employees and total assets, both 
expressed in natural logarithm as done by Yin and Yang (2013). This means that the banks’ 
sensitivity increases with respect to the characteristic. For market capitalization, this 
decreasing trend is less clear, the relation could be non-linear. The third and fourth plot are for 
market capitalization, but the fourth plot is restricted to banks with a capitalization lower than 
€20 million. The decreasing trend seems more clear for banks with a lower market 
capitalization, suggesting that this characteristic has an impact which vanishes after a certain 
level, in fact there is a non significant difference between Medium and High portfolios in the 
baseline dataset. 
The correlations between the bank sensitivity and these three characteristics support the 
findings: the correlations of the sensitivity are: -0,74 (-0,75 for the extended dataset) with 
employees, -0,73 (-0,68 for the extended dataset) with total assets, -0,50 (-0,16 for the 
extended dataset) with market capitalization (for the full correlation matrices, see Table 4.30 
and Table 4.31). Therefore, there are high correlations at least for employees and total assets. 
Table 4.14: Bank size: Results of the regression of the sensitivity on a characteristic

The Table 4.14 confirms the previous results, since the coefficient is negative and 
strongly significant for employees and total assets with both datasets. For capitalization 
instead the strongly significant and negative coefficient is found only with the baseline 
dataset. 
In summary, the number of employees and total assets are strongly related to bank 
sensitivity to unconventional monetary policy surprise. For market capitalization, the findings 
suggest that there is an impact only below a certain level of market capitalization. 
Baseline Extended
Emp -2,477 *** -2,486 ***
Asset -2,312 *** -1,996 ***
Cap -0,2 *** -0,0264
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4.3.2: Activity mix 
Table 4.15: Activity mix: portfolio coeﬃcients

The activity mix is measured by the net interest income divided by total operating 
income, and the total loans divided by total assets. 
The Table 4.15 shows that, for the net interest income portfolios, the impact is 
maximum for the Medium portfolio, and the coefficients of the High and Low portfolios are 
similar. From the models with dummy variables, we find again a maximum value for the 
Medium portfolio, with two exceptions. Firstly, the impact becomes increasing in the post-QE 
period. Secondly, the impact is decreasing when there isn’t a direction change, even if the 
difference between coefficients is low. Results with the actual change of the policy rate are 
similar. The extended dataset provides an opposite result, with the Medium portfolio having 
the minimum impact. 
About the loan to asset ratio, the trend is decreasing. This means that the higher the 
percentage of loans on the bank’s assets, the lower the sensitivity to unconventional monetary 
policy surprises. Results of the models with dummy variables are in line with the baseline, 
since for all specifications the impact is decreasing. The extended dataset provides the same 
decreasing trend, with lower coefficients of all three portfolios. 
Table 4.16: Activity mix: SURE test

Baseline (47 banks, 2000-2018) Extended (70 banks, 2007-2018)
High Med Low trend High Med Low trend
Net interest 
income
-7,85 -10,81 -7,59 max -9,26 -5,63 -6,95 min
Loan to 
asset ratio
-5,14 -8,35 -12,21 decreasing -3,99 -7,35 -10,58 decreasing
Baseline High=Medium High=Low Medium=Low High=Med=Low Trend
Nii 0,0023 *** 0,7786 0,0008 *** 0,0013 *** max
Loan 0,0001 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0001 *** 0,0000 *** decreasing
Extended High=Medium High=Low Medium=Low High=Med=Low Trend
Nii 0,0000 *** 0,0073 *** 0,1453 0,0000 *** min
Loan 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0001 *** 0,0000 *** decreasing
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The Table 4.16 shows that, for portfolios based on loans, the differences between 
coefficients are all strongly significant (p-values are never higher than 0,0001), for both 
baseline and extended dataset.  
About the net interest income, for the baseline dataset the sensitivity of the Medium 
portfolio is significantly higher than that of the other two portfolios, and the sensitivity of the 
High and Low portfolios are not significantly different. This suggests that banks with a low 
net interest income have a similar sensitivity of those with a high net interest income, but in 
the middle the sensitivity is significantly higher. 
Results differ with the extended dataset, where the Medium portfolio has a minimum 
value instead of a maximum, and the Medium and Low portfolios do not have a significantly 
different coefficient. This could suggest an increasing trend, where the sensitivity do not vary 
significantly from Low to Medium, but it increases significantly from Medium to Low. 
 
Figure 4.2: Plots for Nii (all and restricted), and Loans, obtained with Stata

The first plot in Figure 4.2 is for the net interest income, and it suggests that this 
measure is not correlated with the spread sensitivity. This is confirmed by the second plot, 
which restrict the banks to those with an absolute value of this measure lower than 20. These 
two plots confirm the non clear relation between this measure and the sensitivity found 
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before. The third plot is for the loan to asset ratio, it does not give strong support to the 
decreasing sensitivity (and so an increasing coefficient), since it seems not very correlated. An 
increasing coefficient means that banks with a higher ratio have a higher coefficient, but some 
banks with a high ratio have a coefficient lower than some with a low ratio. The correlations 
of the sensitivity with these two measures are 0,15 and 0,26 for the NII and loan to asset ratio 
respectively (0,10 and 0,29 with the extended dataset), supporting the low relation with the 
NII, but contrasting the strong relation found for loans portfolios. 
Table 4.17: Activity mix: Results of the regression of the sensitivity on a characteristic

The regression results in Table 4.17 support the findings from portfolios, since the net 
interest income is not significant, and the loan to asset ratio is significant, even if not strongly 
significant, in fact plots give no support to the decreasing impact. 
In summary, the net interest income share to the total operating income does not affect 
the sensitivity of the banks to unconventional monetary policy, and the evidence about the 
loan to asset ratio is not clear, since portfolios and SURE test suggest a decreasing sensitivity, 
but the plot do not support this finding. 
4.3.3: Bank soundness 
Table 4.18: Bank soundness: portfolio coeﬃcients

The bank soundness is measured with the ratio between total capital and total assets, 
which is also an indicator of funding sources, since it is inversely related to the leverage. 
The Table 4.18 shows a maximum value for the Medium portfolio. However, the 
coefficients are very close to each other. Watching at the alternative model specifications, the 
trend differ for the post-QE period, when it is decreasing, even if there is again a low 
Baseline Extended
Nii 0,154 0,0556
Loan 0,0949 * 0,0964 **
Baseline (47 banks, 2000-2018) Extended (70 banks, 2007-2018)
High Med Low trend High Med Low trend
Capital to 
asset ratio
-7,95 -8,99 -8,49 max -7,80 -7,062 -7,059 increasing
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difference between coefficients.  
The coefficients of High, Medium and Low are increasing (-7,05, -6,31, -4,73) for 
positive values of Spread, and decreasing (-8,35, -11,32, -11,72) for negative values. This 
suggests that a high capital to asset ratio increases the sensitivity to a contractionary 
unconventional monetary policy shock, but decreases the sensitivity to an expansionary 
shock. Remembering that in general an expansionary shock has a higher impact than a 
contractionary one (see subsection 4.2.3 of this thesis), this implies that a high capital to asset 
ratio decreases the difference between the impact of positive and negative shocks. With the 
extended dataset the trend is increasing, but the coefficients are again very close to each other. 
Table 4.19: Bank soundness: SURE test

The Table 4.19 shows that, with both datasets, none of the coefficients of the three 
portfolios is significantly different from the others. This is confirmed by the joint test, which 
does not reject the null hypothesis that the three coefficients are all equal. This is the only 
characteristic for which the joint test is not significant, that is the only characteristic for which 
the coefficients of the three portfolios are not significantly different. Therefore, the sensitivity 
seems to not depend on the capital to asset ratio. 
'  
Figure 4.3: Plot for Cta, obtained with Stata

The plot on the Figure 4.3 confirms that there is no clear impact of the capital to asset 
Baseline High=Medium High=Low Medium=Low High=Med=Low Trend
Cta 0,1871 0,6179 0,5408 0,3686 max
Extended High=Medium High=Low Medium=Low High=Med=Low Trend
Cta 0,2548 0,4422 0,9972 0,5106 increasing
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ratio. Moreover, the correlation of the sensitivity with the capital to asset ratio is -0,07 (-0,12 
with the extended dataset), so it is very low. 
Table 4.20: Bank soundness: Results of the regression of the sensitivity on a characteristic

The regression results in Table 4.20 show that the coefficient is not significant with both 
datasets, supporting the previous results. In summary, all findings agree that the bank 
soundness does not affect the sensitivity to unconventional monetary policy surprises. 
4.3.4: Funding sources 
Table 4.21: Funding sources: portfolio coeﬃcients

The funding sources are measured by two quantities, that is the deposits to liabilities 
ratio and the debt to equity ratio.  
The Table 4.21 shows that, for both characteristics and for both datasets, the Medium 
portfolio has the maximum sensitivity, which means that if these ratios are not too high and 
not too low the sensitivity is high. The Medium portfolio has a maximum sensitivity also in 
all the models with dummy variables for both characteristics. 
Table 4.22: Funding sources: SURE test

Baseline Extended
Cta -4,875 -5,325
Baseline (47 banks, 2000-2018) Extended (70 banks, 2007-2018)
High Med Low trend High Med Low trend
Deposits -4,09 -13,02 -9,42 max -3,74 -11,68 -6,69 max
Debt to 
equity
-6,33 -12,08 -7,23 max -4,58 -10,80 -6,85 max
Baseline High=Medium High=Low Medium=Low High=Med=Low Trend
Dep 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0395 ** 0,0000 *** max
Dte 0,0000 *** 0,3585 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** max
Extended High=Medium High=Low Medium=Low High=Med=Low Trend
Dep 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0001 *** 0,0000 *** max
Dte 0,0000 *** 0,0226 ** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** max
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The SURE tests in the Table 4.22 show that, for debt to equity portfolios, the High and 
Low portfolios don’t have a significantly different impact, suggesting, similarly to the net 
interest income (see subsection 4.3.2: Activity mix), that the impact is similar for those with a 
high or low debt to equity ratio, but in the middle the impact is stronger.  
For deposits portfolios, the impact on High and Low portfolios is significantly different. 
The trend is strange, given that the impact increases significantly from Low to Medium, but 
from Medium to High this impact decreases and it becomes not only significantly lower than 
the Medium portfolio, but also than the Low portfolios. With the extended dataset, this strange 
trend is found for both debt to equity and deposits. 
 
Figure 4.4: Plots for Dep and Dte, obtained with Stata

The plots in Figure 4.4 do not show a strong relationship for all two measures. The plot 
for deposits (first plot) do not show a clear relation. For the plot about debt to equity ratio 
(second plot), banks with a low ratio can have a high or low sensitivity, but those with a high 
ratio have a relatively low sensitivity.  
In addition, the correlations of the sensitivity with deposits and debt to equity are 0,36 
and 0,33 respectively (0,22 and 0,36 with the extended dataset), that is positive correlations, 
but not very high. 
Table 4.23: Funding sources: Results of the regression of the sensitivity on a characteristic

About the regression results in Table 4.23, deposits and debt to equity are significant 
Baseline Extended
Dep 13,74 ** 7,019 *
Dte 0,00016 ** 0,0723 ***
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with both datasets, even if we did not find a clear trend from portfolios coefficients. Results 
are contrasting, and plots do not clarify if these two characteristics matter.  
In conclusion, there is no clear relationship between the two measures of funding 
sources and bank sensitivity, something previously found also for the capital to asset ratio, 
another measure of funding sources. 
4.3.5: Market data 
Table 4.24: Market data: portfolio coeﬃcients

The two market data chosen for this analysis are the market to book ratio and the price 
to earnings ratio. 
The Table 4.24 shows for both measures a maximum impact on the Medium portfolios. 
From the alternative model specifications, the sensitivity to spread decreases is increasing 
with the market to book ratio. This result is confirmed when considering the actual change for 
the conventional monetary policy. With the actual change, in addition, we find an increasing 
impact with the price to earnings ratio for spread increases. 
For the price to earnings ratio, we find a decreasing impact when the direction of policy 
doesn’t change, and again a decreasing impact when there is a contemporaneous conventional 
monetary policy day. Both results are confirmed when using the actual change in the policy 
rate. 
With the extended dataset, we find the same trend for the market to book ratio, and for 
the price to earnings ratio instead there is an increasing trend. 
Baseline (47 banks, 2000-2018) Extended (70 banks, 2007-2018)
High Med Low trend High Med Low trend
Market to 
book
-9,27 -10,96 -5,33 max -7,45 -9,98 -4,73 max
Price to 
earnings
-8,28 -9,47 -7,72 max -9,04 -7,84 -5,01 increasing
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Table 4.25: Market data: SURE test

The Table 4.25 shows that, for the price to earnings ratio, the impact on High and Low 
portfolios are not significantly different. For the market to book ratio, all three coefficients are 
significantly different from each other. Contrary to what seen for portfolios based on deposits 
(see the previous subsection), the High portfolio has a sensitivity bigger than that of the Low 
portfolio, so the sensitivity increases with the market to book ratio, but after a certain level it 
decreases, remaining bigger than that for Low portfolios. With the extended dataset, results 
for the market to book ratio are similar, instead for the price to earnings ratio we find an 
increasing trend, with all coefficients significantly different from each other. 
'  
Figure 4.5: Plots for Mtb and Pe, obtained with Stata

The plots in Figure 4.5 do not show a clear correlation between the bank sensitivity and 
these two measures. The correlations of the sensitivity with the market to book and price to 
earnings ratio are -0,21 and -0,14 respectively (-0,01 and -0,06 for the extended dataset), so 
they are very low, especially from the extended dataset. Therefore, even if the only finding 
about a clear trend is for the price to earnings ratio in the extended dataset, the plot (referred 
to the extended dataset, as already said) does not show a clear trend. 
Baseline High=Medium High=Low Medium=Low High=Med=Low Trend
Mtb 0,0977 * 0,0069 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** max
Pe 0,0914 * 0,5927 0,0248 ** 0,0220 ** max
Extended High=Medium High=Low Medium=Low High=Med=Low Trend
Mtb 0,0018 *** 0,0146 ** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** max
Pe 0,0214 ** 0,0000 *** 0,0002 *** 0,0000 *** increasing
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Table 4.26: Market data: Results of the regression of the sensitivity on a characteristic

The regression results in Table 4.26 show that the market to book and price to earnings 
ratio are not significant with both datasets, even if we found an increasing trend for the price 
to earnings ratio with the extended dataset. In conclusion, we do not find evidence of an 
impact of the two market data on the sensitivity. 
4.3.6: Government securities 
Table 4.27: Government securities: portfolio coeﬃcients

Given that asset purchase programmes are targeted to buy mainly government 
securities, the banks which hold them in their portfolio are sensitive to these actions. The 
interest on government securities is a measure of the government securities held by a bank.  
The Table 4.27 shows a clearly higher impact on banks earning more on government 
securities. We find strong support to this increasing impact from the alternative model 
specifications, given that all the other models have an impact increasing with this 
characteristic. The findings from the extended dataset are in line with baseline results. 
Table 4.28: Government securities: SURE test

From the SURE tests in Table 4.28, we find that the High and Medium portfolios have a 
Baseline Extended
Mtb -2,704 -0,0683
Pe -0,0959 -0,0229
Baseline (47 banks, 2000-2018) Extended (70 banks, 2007-2018)
High Med Low trend High Med Low trend
Interest on 
government 
securities
-12,86 -11,63 -1,86 increasing -11,39 -9,02 -1,89 increasing
Baseline High=Medium High=Low Medium=Low High=Med=Low Trend
Gov 0,2604 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** increasing
Extended High=Medium High=Low Medium=Low High=Med=Low Trend
Gov 0,0461 ** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** 0,0000 *** increasing
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significantly higher sensitivity than that of Low portfolios, and even if the High portfolio has 
a bigger sensitivity than the Medium, this difference is not significant. However, with the 
extended dataset these two portfolios have significantly different impacts. 
'  
Figure 4.6: Plot for Gov, obtained with Stata

The plot on the Figure 4.6 shows a decreasing coefficient (and so an increasing 
sensitivity), even if only after a certain level. When the value is low, the sensitivity depends 
on other bank characteristics, so it can be high or low. The correlation between the sensitivity 
and this characteristic is -0,38 (-0,38 also for the extended dataset), so not very high but also 
not very low. 
Table 4.29: Government securities: Results of the regression of the sensitivity on a characteristic

The regression results in Table 4.29 show that the interest on government securities is 
strongly significant with both datasets, supporting previous results. This measure seems to 
explain the sensitivity of banks to unconventional monetary policy surprises. However, this 
measure is highly correlated with bank size (see the Table 4.30 and Table 4.31 in the next 
subsection), and even if this measure has a clear impact, the evidence shows a clearer impact 
of bank size than government securities. This could suggest that the measure of government 
securities has an impact only through its correlation with bank size. 
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Gov -0,00138 *** -0,00107 ***
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4.3.7: Correlation matrix of sensitivity and characteristics 
The Table 4.30 is the correlation matrix between the bank sensitivity and each 
characteristic, for the baseline dataset, and the Table 4.31 is the correlation matrix for the 
extended dataset. These tables show a very high correlation between employees and assets 
(0,97, 0,93 for the extended dataset), and both are highly correlated with the sensitivity. This 
suggests that the bank size, expressed either in terms of number of employees or total assets, 
is the characteristic more correlated to the bank sensitivity, among the characteristics 
examined. In addition, interest on government securities has a high correlation with these two 
characteristics, in fact larger banks can hold more government securities, and so they earn 
more interest. 
Other strong correlations are found for market capitalization with employees and assets, 
even if only in the baseline dataset, and for interest on government securities with market 
capitalization. There is also a high correlation (-0,71) between debt to equity and market to 
book ratio, but in the extended dataset it decreases a lot (-0,46). 
Table 4.30: Correlation matrix between sensitivity (Spr) and characteristics, baseline dataset

base Spr Emp Asset Cap Nii Loan Cta Dep Dte Mtb Pe Gov
Spr 1 -0,74 -0,73 -0,50 0,15 0,26 -0,07 0,36 0,33 -0,21 -0,14 -0,38
Emp -0,74 1 0,97 0,78 -0,08 -0,32 -0,19 -0,27 -0,20 0,12 0,07 0,70
Asset -0,73 0,97 1 0,76 -0,04 -0,40 -0,22 -0,41 -0,15 0,06 0,06 0,71
Cap -0,50 0,78 0,76 1 0,07 -0,44 -0,31 -0,16 -0,27 0,20 0,23 0,89
Nii 0,15 -0,08 -0,04 0,07 1 -0,15 -0,15 -0,03 0,09 0,06 0,16 0,11
Loan 0,26 -0,32 -0,40 -0,44 -0,15 1 0,43 0,45 0,25 -0,21 -0,36 -0,49
Cta -0,07 -0,19 -0,22 -0,31 -0,15 0,43 1 -0,19 0,23 -0,22 -0,14 -0,38
Dep 0,36 -0,27 -0,41 -0,16 -0,03 0,45 -0,19 1 -0,41 0,28 0,09 -0,22
Dte 0,33 -0,20 -0,15 -0,27 0,09 0,25 0,23 -0,41 1 -0,71 -0,37 -0,19
Mtb -0,21 0,12 0,06 0,20 0,06 -0,21 -0,22 0,28 -0,71 1 0,15 0,08
Pe -0,14 0,07 0,06 0,23 0,16 -0,36 -0,14 0,09 -0,37 0,15 1 0,37
Gov -0,38 0,70 0,71 0,89 0,11 -0,49 -0,38 -0,22 -0,19 0,08 0,37 1
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Table 4.31: Correlation matrix between sensitivity (Spr) and characteristics, extended dataset

4.3.8: Multiple regressions 
We compute regressions of the bank sensitivity on the six categories of characteristics, 
considering all the various combinations of characteristics for each category. We have 3 
characteristics for bank size, 2 for activity mix, 1 for bank soundness, 2 for funding sources, 2 
for market data, 1 for government securities. In total, we have 3x2x1x2x2x1=24 regressions. 
The Table 4.32 shows for each characteristic how many times the coefficient is significant at 
10% level, how many times the characteristic is used, and the percentage of significant 
coefficients, for both baseline and extended dataset. A somewhat similar procedure is used by 
Yin and Yang (2013), they examine four categories and use two characteristic for each 
category. This method provides a robustness check to the regressions on a single 
characteristic, since it allows watching whether, controlling for the characteristics of other 
categories, the characteristic is still significant or not. 
ext Spr Emp Asset Cap Nii Loan Cta Dep Dte Mtb Pe Gov
Spr 1 -0,75 -0,68 -0,16 0,10 0,29 -0,12 0,22 0,36 -0,01 -0,06 -0,38
Emp -0,75 1 0,93 0,36 -0,03 -0,29 -0,09 -0,23 -0,20 -0,09 0,11 0,63
Asset -0,68 0,93 1 0,50 -0,01 -0,36 -0,21 -0,41 -0,07 -0,09 -0,03 0,73
Cap -0,16 0,36 0,50 1 0,05 -0,25 -0,08 -0,14 0,04 0,16 0,06 0,67
Nii 0,10 -0,03 -0,01 0,05 1 -0,13 -0,18 0,02 0,06 0,05 0,07 0,11
Loan 0,29 -0,29 -0,36 -0,25 -0,13 1 0,37 0,26 0,32 -0,34 -0,36 -0,55
Cta -0,12 -0,09 -0,21 -0,08 -0,18 0,37 1 -0,32 0,16 -0,06 0,10 -0,28
Dep 0,22 -0,23 -0,41 -0,14 0,02 0,26 -0,32 1 -0,52 0,31 0,22 -0,23
Dte 0,36 -0,20 -0,07 0,04 0,06 0,32 0,16 -0,52 1 -0,46 -0,35 -0,11
Mtb -0,01 -0,09 -0,09 0,16 0,05 -0,34 -0,06 0,31 -0,46 1 0,15 0,10
Pe -0,06 0,11 -0,03 0,06 0,07 -0,36 0,10 0,22 -0,35 0,15 1 0,38
Gov -0,38 0,63 0,73 0,67 0,11 -0,55 -0,28 -0,23 -0,11 0,10 0,38 1
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Table 4.32: Significant coeﬃcients for the overall regressions

About bank size, it is always significant when expressed in terms of employees and total 
assets, instead about capitalization we have all coefficients significant with the baseline 
dataset, and none significant with the extended dataset, a strange result. These results strongly 
support the finding of a strong relationship of employees and assets with the sensitivity, while 
remaining uncertain the role of market capitalization. 
The net interest income is never significant for both datasets, in line with previous 
results of a weak relationship with the sensitivity. For loans, instead, we find some significant 
coefficient only in the extended dataset. This is in line with previous results of an absent 
impact of the net interest income and an unclear result for loans. 
We find a contrasting result for the capital to asset ratio, with respect to what seen 
before. In fact, there is a considerable amount of significant coefficients, even if we 
previously found no relationship of this characteristic with the sensitivity. 
Among measures of funding sources, the deposits to liabilities ratio is sometimes 
significant, leaving the results inconclusive. The debt to equity ratio is usually significant, 
which contrasts with previous results. This increases the uncertainty about the link between 
the sensitivity and funding sources. 
The two market data, that is the market to book and price to earnings ratios, are 
sometimes significant, giving no clear evidence about the impact of this category of 
characteristics. This confirms the unclear evidence seen before. 
Baseline Extended
Significant Total Ratio Significant Total Ratio
Emp 8 8 100% 8 8 100%
Asset 8 8 100% 8 8 100%
Cap 8 8 100% 0 8 0%
Nii 0 12 0% 0 12 0%
Loan 0 12 0% 4 12 33,33%
Cta 14 24 58,33% 20 24 83,33%
Dep 6 12 50% 1 12 8,33%
Dte 9 12 75% 12 12 100%
Mtb 5 12 41,67% 1 12 8,33%
Pe 4 12 33,33% 3 12 25%
Gov 8 24 33,33% 19 24 79,17%
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Interest on government securities is sometimes significant, but in the extended dataset it 
is significant many times, supporting previous findings of a relationship not very strong and 
not very weak. 
Given that the interest on government securities is highly correlated with measures of 
bank size, we redo this analysis without the interest on government securities, leaving only 
five characteristics for each regression. The findings do not differ so much from that shown in 
the table, and the conclusions are the same. 
In summary, for bank size, activity mix and government securities, findings are in line 
with previous results. Instead, for capital to asset ratio and market data, we find some 
evidence of an impact, even if we previously do not find it. For funding sources the evidence 
is not clear, as for the previous findings. 
4.3.9: Comparison with conventional monetary policy 
Table 4.33: Unconventional and conventional monetary policy, trends of characteristics

The Table 4.33 shows, for each characteristic, the trend of the coefficients of Spread and 
of Unexp and Exp, from the baseline model, and also of Unexp and Exp in the pre- and post-
crisis periods. Unexp 0 and Exp 0 are the pre-crisis coefficients, Unexp 1 and Exp 1 the post-
crisis coefficients. 
About the bank size, in general we find an increasing trend of the conventional 
monetary policy, as for unconventional monetary policy. The coefficient of Unexp is 
Spread Unexp Unexp 0 Unexp 1 Exp Exp 0 Exp 1
Emp increasing increasing increasing max max increasing max
Asset increasing increasing min increasing increasing increasing increasing
Cap increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing
Nii max increasing increasing max min max increasing
Loan decreasing decreasing decreasing max max min decreasing
Cta max decreasing decreasing min decreasing max decreasing
Dep max max max max max decreasing max
Dte max decreasing decreasing max max decreasing decreasing
Mtb max increasing increasing min min max min
Pe max increasing min min min max decreasing
Gov increasing increasing increasing min max min increasing
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increasing for all three characteristics, but only for the portfolios based on market 
capitalization this holds for both periods. The coefficient of Exp is increasing for portfolios 
based on assets and market capitalization, and this is valid in both periods. Instead, for 
portfolios based on number of employees, the trend of Exp is increasing only in the pre-crisis 
period. In summary, both conventional and unconventional monetary policy have an 
increasing impact with respect to bank size, even if for conventional monetary policy the 
evidence is not as strong as for the unconventional one. 
About the activity mix, for portfolios based on loans the decreasing trend for 
unconventional monetary policy is found also on Unexp in the pre-crisis period and on Exp in 
the post-crisis. For portfolios based on net interest income, we did not find an increasing or 
decreasing trend for unconventional monetary policy, but the trend is increasing for Unexp in 
the pre-crisis period and for Exp in the post-crisis period. In summary, the conventional policy 
is in line with the unconventional for loan portfolios, instead for net interest income portfolios 
both types of policy have a not very clear impact. 
About the capital to asset ratio, for unconventional monetary policy we did not find a 
clear trend, and for conventional policy we find that in the pre-crisis period the trend is 
decreasing for Unexp, and in the post-crisis period it is decreasing for Exp. Therefore, as for 
the net interest income, the two types of policy have a different trend. 
About funding sources, we found for unconventional monetary policy a maximum for 
the Medium portfolio, and for the conventional monetary policy we find sometimes a 
decreasing trend and sometimes a maximum for the Medium portfolio. The findings are not 
very clear, as for unconventional monetary policy. 
For the market to book and price to earnings ratios, we did not find a clear trend for 
unconventional monetary policy, but we find an increasing trend for Unexp, even if dividing 
into the two periods this trend disappears for the price to earnings ratio, and it remains only in 
the pre-crisis period for the market to book ratio. 
For the interest on government securities, the increasing trend found for unconventional 
monetary policy is found in the pre-crisis period for Unexp and in the post-crisis period for 
Exp. Therefore, the two types of policy have a similar impact. 
In summary, the conventional monetary policy in general has not the same trend in the 
two periods and for the two components of the policy rate, Unexp and Exp. The only 
characteristic where we find always the same trend is market capitalization. In general, the 
trend of conventional monetary policy can be different from those for unconventional 
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monetary policy, but they are never really contrasting results, for example we never find a 
clear decreasing trend of one type of policy and a clear increasing trend for the other type. 
4.3.10: Robustness check: alternative datasets 
Table 4.34: Trends from the alternative datasets

The Table 4.34 shows the trend of the coefficients for the baseline model (without 
dummy variables), for each characteristic and for each dataset. The rows show the 
characteristics, the columns show the various alternative datasets, previously described in 
Table 3.4. 
In general, the trends obtained with the alternative dataset specifications do not differ 
much with respect to the baseline dataset, providing robustness to our results. There are only 
four exceptions, and all but one concern the extended dataset. For this reason, in the previous 
subsections we considered the results both from the baseline and the extended dataset. The 
use of the other Euribor future and the exclusion of outliers never change the trends. Using a 
two-day window, the only different result is for the capital to asset ratio, where we find a 
decreasing impact instead of a maximum value for the Medium portfolio. 
Considering the extended dataset, there are three trends that differ with respect to the 
baseline dataset. Firstly, for the net interest income portfolios, we find a minimum value for 
the Medium portfolio. Secondly, for the capital to asset ratio portfolios, we find an increasing 
impact. Finally, for price to earnings ratio portfolios the impact is increasing. In the baseline 
Baseline Future Twoday Twodayfut Ext2007 Ext2007fut Outliers
Emp increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing
Asset increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing
Cap increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing
Nii max max max max min min max
Loan decreasing decreasing decreasing decreasing decreasing decreasing decreasing
Cta max max decreasing decreasing increasing increasing max
Dep max max max max max max max
Dte max max max max max max max
Mtb max max max max max max max
Pe max max max max increasing increasing max
Gov increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing increasing
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dataset, all these three types of portfolios show a maximum value for the Medium portfolio. 
About the capital to asset ratio, even if we find a different trend with the extended 
dataset, the coefficients are very close to each other for both datasets. In fact, the SURE test 
do not reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients for both datasets. About the net interest 
income portfolios, the trend changes from a maximum to a minimum value for the Medium 
portfolio, but in any case the findings are not clear with both datasets. About the price to 
earnings ratio, even if we find an increasing trend with the extended dataset, this is not 
supported by the plot and regression of the bank sensitivity on the value of this characteristic. 
In summary, even if for three characteristics the trend differs, the main conclusions do not 
change much. 
4.3.11: Overall portfolios 
Table 4.35: Coeﬃcients of the overall portfolios for the various datasets

The Table 4.35 shows the coefficients of Spread on the equation for the two overall 
portfolios, equally weighted (All) and capitalization weighted (AllW), for each dataset. 
The sensitivity of the capitalization weighted portfolio is always higher than that of the 
equally weighted, since the highest capitalized banks are more sensitive to Spread, something 
already discussed. The use of another Euribor future does not change much the coefficients.  
The exclusion of outliers reduces the impact of Spread, for both portfolios, even if of a 
low magnitude for the equally weighted. Instead, for the capitalization weighted, it decreases 
of about 1 point. 
Using a two-day window causes an increase of the sensitivity of about 2 points for the 
equally weighted and of about 3 points for the capitalization weighted. However, we cannot 
All AllW
Baseline -8,47 -13,28
Future -8,43 -13,24
Twoday -10,80 -16,88
Ext2007 -7,31 -10,53
Twodayfut -10,81 -16,83
Ext2007fut -7,22 -10,43
Outliers -8,04 -12,20
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say if it is a delayed reaction or the increased influence of omitted variables. 
The extended dataset provides a coefficient lower of about 1 point for the equally 
weighted and of about 3 points for the capitalization weighted, maybe due to a lower 
sensitivity of banks which are added to the sample. 
In conclusion, an equally weighted portfolio of Eurozone banks reacts to a 1 basis point 
change in the spread with an opposite change of the returns of about 8 basis points on a daily 
basis, and a capitalization weighted portfolio instead reacts with an opposite change of 10 to 
13 basis points on a daily basis. 
4.4: DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
4.4.1: Comparison with other articles 
Among the articles seen in the literature review, let’s see again those treating the topic 
of how firm characteristics affect the impact of monetary policy. Thorbecke (1997) finds that 
“monetary shocks have larger effects on small firms than large firms”. Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2004) find that “firms with low cashflows, small size, poor credit ratings, low 
debt to capital ratios, high price-earnings ratio or a high Tobin’s q are affected significantly 
more by US monetary policy”. Flannery and James (1984) find that the interest rate 
sensitivity of bank stocks “is positively related to the size of the maturity difference between 
the firm’s nominal assets and liabilities”, and the findings of Kwan (1991) confirm this result. 
Madura and Schnusenberg (2000) find that “larger commercial banks and low-capital-ratio 
commercial banks are more [interest rate sensitive]”. Kobayashi et al. (2006) find that the 
“quantitative easing disproportionately benefited the weakest Japanese banks and industries”. 
The two articles from which the characteristics for the analysis of this thesis are taken 
are Yin and Yang (2013) and Haitsma et al. (2016). Yin and Yang (2013) focus on banks, and 
they find a stronger reaction from large banks (measured by number of employees and total 
assets) and from banks which rely more on non deposit funding (measured by deposits 
divided by liabilities and non deposit short term funding divided by total deposits and short 
term funding). They do not find a significant impact of the activity mix (measured by net 
interest income divided by total operating income and loans divided by assets) and bank 
soundness (measured by capital to asset ratio and Z-score). 
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Haitsma et al. (2016) do not focus specifically on banks, but on the whole stock market. 
About unconventional monetary policy, they do not find an effect of size, and the impact is 
stronger for firms with a high debt to equity ratio, low market to book ratio, and low price to 
earnings ratio. 
The Table 4.36 summarizes the results from these articles for the characteristics 
examined in this thesis. The columns show the characteristics, whether they are referred to 
firms in general or to banks, the article, the policy type (C=conventional, U=unconventional) 
and the impact found. Among the articles in the table, only Haitsma et al. (2016) focus on 
Eurozone, the others on USA. The Table 4.37 summarizes the results of this thesis. 
Table 4.36: Characteristics results from other articles

characteristic firm / bank source type impact
activity mix (Nii, loans) bank Yin and Yang (2013) C no impact
capital to asset bank Madura and Schnusenberg (2000) C decreasing
capital to asset bank Yin and Yang (2013) C no impact
debt to equity firm Haitsma et al. (2016) U increasing
debt to equity firm Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) C decreasing
deposits to liabilities bank Yin and Yang (2013) C decreasing
market to book firm Haitsma et al. (2016) U decreasing
price to earnings firm Haitsma et al. (2016) U decreasing
price to earnings firm Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) C increasing
size (market capitalization) firm Haitsma et al. (2016) U no impact
size (employees, market 
value)
firm Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) C decreasing
size (market value) bank Madura and Schnusenberg (2000) C increasing
size (employees, assets) bank Yin and Yang (2013) C increasing
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Table 4.37: Summary of characteristics results from this thesis

This thesis provides strong evidence that larger banks are more affected by 
unconventional monetary policy. Haitsma et al. (2016), which focus on firms in general, find 
instead no impact of size. According to Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), the conventional 
monetary policy affects less the larger firms, but according to Madura and Schnusenberg 
(2000) and Yin and Yang (2013), for banks it works oppositely, with larger banks more 
affected. 
According to Yin and Yang (2013), “large firms are better collateralized and thus more 
immune than small firms [to monetary policy]. […] However, […] the size factor works 
differently for banks, …[since] large banks rely more on the federal funds market for 
financing”, therefore large banks are more sensitive to conventional monetary policy. Our 
findings for conventional monetary policy are consistent with this article, and our findings for 
unconventional monetary policy suggest that also this type of policy has more effect on large 
banks. 
Yin and Yang (2013) examine also the impact of the activity mix. They hypothesize that 
nonbanking activity is more interest rate sensitive with respect to the normal banking activity, 
so banks which rely more on nonbanking activity should be more sensitive. They find that, 
despite an initial evidence of an impact, this impact disappears when controlling for other 
bank characteristics. 
Our findings for unconventional monetary policy provide evidence of no impact of net 
interest income, and for loan to asset ratio the evidence from portfolios is that the trend is 
characteristic impact robustness
Employees increasing strong
Total assets increasing strong
Market capitalization increasing high
Net interest income / operating income no impact strong
Loans / assets decreasing medium
Capital / assets no impact strong
Deposits / liabilities no impact medium
Debt to equity no impact medium
Market to book no impact medium
Price to earnings no impact medium
Interest on government securities increasing high
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decreasing, even if there is low support to this finding from the other results. 
We find no clear role of the capital to asset ratio on the impact of unconventional 
monetary policy, as found for the conventional monetary policy by Yin and Yang (2013). 
Yin and Yang (2013) find a decreasing impact of deposits to liabilities ratio. Haitsma et 
al. (2016) find that firms with a high debt to equity ratio, that is highly indebted firms, are 
more sensitive to unconventional monetary policy surprises. We find no clear evidence of an 
impact of measures of funding sources. Therefore, the measures of funding sources seem to 
not explain the sensitivity of banks, but they explain that of firms in general. 
Haitsma et al. (2016) find a decreasing impact on firms of the price to earnings and 
market to book ratios. However, our results suggest that this impact is not present on banks. 
4.4.2: Results interpretation 
The unconventional monetary policies consist mainly of asset purchases and long term 
refinancing. The asset purchases affect the asset side of the balance sheet, the long term 
refinancing affect the liabilities side. Therefore, the finding that larger banks are affected more 
can be interpreted similarly to Yin and Yang (2013), which say that large banks rely more on 
short term funding from the central bank, and this could be valid also for longer term funding. 
About asset purchases, large banks hold more assets, and if larger banks hold a higher 
proportion of assets subject to asset purchase programmes, this could make banks more 
sensitive to these operations. 
The finding that banks with a lower loan to asset ratio are more sensitive to 
unconventional monetary policy can be explained by the fact that if banks hold fewer loans in 
their asset portfolio, this means that they invest more in other types of assets, maybe including 
the assets of the purchase programmes, and so they are more sensitive to unconventional 
monetary policies. However, there is no strong support to the role of the loan to asset ratio 
from the robustness check. 
Haitsma et al. (2016) found that firms are more sensitive if more indebted, supporting 
the credit channel of monetary policy. However, this thesis finds no clear evidence of the role 
of funding sources for banks. 
Highly indebted firms are more sensitive to monetary policy because the change in 
interest rates, which derives from monetary policy, causes a change in their cost of funding. 
However, the fact that for banks there is no effect could be interpreted as the ability of banks 
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to transmit the interest rate changes to firms to which they lend, that is the change in the cost 
of fundings of banks is transmitted to firms through a change in the rate they charge on 
lending. 
Haitsma et al. (2016) find that stocks of firms with a low market to book ratio and a low 
price to earnings ratio are more sensitive to unconventional monetary policy. However, we do 
not find the same result for banks. 
The finding that banks earning more interest from government securities are more 
sensitive to unconventional monetary policy is obviously due to the fact that the asset 
purchases affect the interest that these securities pay, and so those banks which rely more on 
this source of income are more sensitive. However, as already said, larger banks tend to earn 
more interest on government securities, so the higher sensitivity could be driven by the size. 
The results from the aggregate indexes show that there is a strongly significant impact 
on Eurozone, but also on other countries. As expected, the impact is greater for Eurozone than 
the rest of World, and greater for the Europe not part of the Eurozone than the rest of World.  
We find evidence of a bigger impact of spread decreases, that is expansionary monetary 
policy. Madura and Schnusenberg (2000) find that a decrease in the interest rate has more 
impact than an increase, and they interpret this result as the bank “adjusting deposit rates 
faster than lending rates”, and so with an interest rate decrease they cut deposit rates faster 
than they cut lending rates, gaining from deposits faster than what they lose from loans. 
Conversely, when interest rates increase, the deposit rates increase faster than lending rates, 
and they lose from deposits faster than what they gain from loans.  
Another possible explanation suggested by Madura and Schnusenberg (2000) is “a 
higher elasticity of loan demand in response to a decrease in interest rates than to an 
increase”, meaning that when the interest rates decrease, the loans demanded increase since 
they are more convenient, but when the interest rate increase there are still borrowers who 
need funds, and they are willing to pay a higher rate. The latter interpretation could be applied 
to our results. The unconventional monetary policies change the long term interest rates, and 
so the price of loans, and if the elasticity of loan demand is higher for interest rate decreases 
than for increases, it means that banks gain more from decreases than from increases. 
About different types of event days, the evidence from this thesis suggests that the type 
of surprise affecting more the returns is an action during a non meeting day, followed by an 
absent action, in turn followed by an action during a meeting. This could mean that the market 
is more surprised when an action takes place in a non meeting day than during a meeting, and 
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the market is more surprised from an absent action than from an action. 
About the change of the policy direction, we could expect that the market reaction is 
bigger if the direction changes with respect to the previous action, since the market should be 
more surprised. However, we do not find evidence for an additional impact of a direction 
change. 
Our findings about the QE period are not clear. We find surprisingly that the 
unconventional monetary policy surprise is no more significant after the start of QE, but the 
impact is not significantly different from the pre-QE period. We could expect that the QE 
programme made the unconventional monetary policy actions more clear, leading to a 
different impact, but we do not find a clear evidence about that, also because of the limited 
number of event days after the start of QE. 
The finding of a non significant conventional monetary policy can be explained by the 
fact that this type of policy is no more effective, and for this reason the unconventional 
measures were introduced. However, we do not find an impact also in the period before the 
introduction of unconventional measures. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Through an event study methodology, and with the support of other methods to check 
the robustness of the results, we find that the unconventional monetary policy surprise has a 
negative and strongly significant impact on stock returns. The impact on banking sector is 
stronger than on the market in general, and even if there are also other countries significantly 
affected, the impact on Eurozone is stronger than on other countries, as can be expected. 
We find a significantly bigger impact of expansionary than contractionary 
unconventional monetary policy surprises. In addition, an unconventional monetary policy 
surprise has a bigger impact if it does not happen in a governing council meeting day. No 
additional impact is found from a change in the policy direction. 
Trying to understand which bank characteristics affect the response to unconventional 
monetary policy, we find that the main driver of the sensitivity is the bank size, measured by 
the number of employees or total assets. In particular, bigger banks are more sensitive to 
unconventional monetary policy surprises. 
We find evidence for the impact of some other characteristics, even if not as clear and as 
strong as the bank size. According to the portfolio analysis, the banks with a lower loan to 
asset ratio are more sensitive. The measures of funding sources and bank soundness seem not 
clearly correlated with the bank sensitivity. The market to book and price to earnings ratios, 
which are the two market data, have not a role on determining the bank sensitivity. As 
expected, banks which earn more interest on government securities have a higher sensitivity. 
In summary, there is a significant impact of ECB unconventional monetary policy 
surprises on Eurozone bank stock returns, bigger than on the whole market and on the rest of 
the world. The impact is stronger when the shock is expansionary, and when it takes place in a 
day without a governing council meeting. Bank size seems the main characteristic which 
determines the sensitivity of bank stock returns to unconventional monetary policy surprises, 
but it is not the only one. 
The event study allows to estimate the impact on the same day of the monetary policy 
surprise, but it cannot evaluate a long term impact, therefore we don’t know if the impact 
found will persist and, if so, for how long. The event study allows to reduce the impact of 
omitted variables taking only those days when there are monetary policy measures, in this 
way the monetary policy should be the main element affecting stock returns. The event study 
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is one of the most used technique in this topic, as can be seen on the literature review. Other 
methods were proposed, as the identification through heteroschedasticity introduced by 
Rigobon and Sack (2002), to solve the problems of omitted variables and of simultaneous 
determination between interest rate and asset prices. To detect long term effects, the VAR 
method is used by many articles. 
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